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ARTICLES
BEYOND THE PARIS ATTACKS:
UNVEILING THE WAR WITHIN
FRENCH COUNTERTERROR POLICY
KHALED A. BEYDOUN*

"

The ParisAttacks of November 13, 2015, left an indelible mark on France's
culture war with Islam and are poised to permanently reform the identity of
French counterterrorism policy. Since the beginning of the Jacques Chirac
Administration in 1995, the State has maintained a hardline cultural
assimilation campaign as the foundation of its counterterrorprogram. This
campaign culminated in 2004 with the "HeadscarfBan, " and six years
later-under President Nicolas Sarkozy-the enactment of the "Face
Concealment Ban.
The emerging threat of "homegrown radicalization"shifted the State'sfocus
from an assimilationist policy to Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)
Policingin 2012. This counterterrorapproach, employed in the United States,
the United Kingdom, and some European states, is facilitated by building
inroads within Muslim communities and developing the social capital within
them to enhance on-site monitoring, electronic surveillance, and symbiotic
collaboration as the fulcrum of policing and preventing radicalization. The
hardline cultural assimilation approach employed by France, however,
undermines advancement of these vital CVE Policinggoals, ultimately curbing
its effectiveness.
First, this Article analyzes the strategic tensions between the cultural
assimilation counterterrorphilosophy, championed by Chirac and Sarhozy,
and the emergent CVE Policingparadigm. Second, it proposes that the State's
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interest in advancing its counterterrorismgoals requires retrenching hardline
cultural assimilation policies. Dissolution of such policies, most notably the
Headscarfand Face Concealment Bans, is a vital step toward implementing a
sustainableand effective CVE Policingprogram.
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Introduction
"Franceis at war! Perhaps. But againstwhom or what?"

-Olivier

Roy'

"And because the lights of Paris epitomize culturalsecularismfor the world
and thus 'ignoranceof divine guidance' [for ISIS], they must be
extinguished.. . .."

-Scott Atran and Nafees Hamid'

1. France's Oedipal Islamist Complex, FOREIGN POL'Y (Jan. 7, 2016),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/07/frances-oedipal-islamist-complex-charliehebdo-islamic-state-isis [hereinafter Roy, France'sOedipal Islamist Complex].
2. Paris: The War ISIS Wants, N.Y. REV. OF BooKs (Nov. 16, 2015, 10:30 AM),
http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2015/11/16/paris-attacks-isis-strategy-chaos/.
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Clichy-sous-Bois, known as the City of Lights, is the darker side of
On the far eastern end of the city lies France's "most
Paris.
notorious" ghetto; the cradle of the demographic threat currently
gripping the nation's imagination.' The city offers a rugged and
lurid portrait of the isolation plaguing France's Muslim citizens: a
second city on the fringes, where young girls in headscarves zigzag
past elderly patriarchs donning beards and kufis, all treading atop
the very same concrete that spawned France's most explosive riots
more than a decade ago.
Clichy-sous-Bois is simultaneously inside and outside of France:
although a French suburb, it is perceived as a breeding ground for
homegrown radicalism and extremism. It is a liminal space where
culture wars with Islam are fought, ground zero for the proliferating
As one of many French Muslim
war against Muslim radicals.
most intimate and existential
embody
the
State's
communities that
fears, Clichy-sous-Bois sourced several of the culprits involved in the
Paris Attacks of November 13, 2015.6
On November 13, 2015, shortly after 9:00 PM, "[t]hree teams of
Islamic State attackers acting in unison carried out the terrorist
assault in Paris," ultimately killing 130 people and wounding 352
others.' The site of the first attack was an international soccer match
between the French National Team and Germany at the Stade de
3. See French Police Trial Over 2005 Zyed and Bouna Deaths, BBC NEWS (Mar. 16,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31903676 [hereinafter French Police
Trial] (noting that Clichy has "long been seen as [a] breeding ground[] for political
and religious extremists").
4. Kufis are skull caps worn by Muslim men, particularly during prayer, as a sign of
respect Robert K Robinson et al., The Hifab and the Kufi: Employer Rights to Convey Their
Business Image Versus Employee Rights to Religious Expression, 22 S.L.J. 79, 80-81 (2012).
5. See Angelique Chrisafis, "Nothing's Changed": 10 Years After French Riots,
AM),
5:11
22,
2015,
(Oct.
Crisis, GUARDIAN
Remain in
Banlieues
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/22/nothings-changed-10-years-after[hereinafter Chrisafis, Nothing's Changed]
french-riots-banlieues-remain-in-crisis
("Despite years of emergency assistance, residents of the suburbs that erupted into
violence in 2005 are still waiting for things to improve.").
6. Anna Maria Tremonti, After Paris Attacks, Muslim Residents in Clichy-sous-Bois
Face Heightened Scrutiny, CBC: CURRENT (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.cbc.ca/radio/
thecurrent/the-current-for-november-1 7-2015-1.3322358/after-paris-attacks-muslimresidents-in-clichy-sous-bois-face-heightened-scrutiny-1.3322364.
7. Adam Nossiter et al., Three Teams of CoordinatedAttackers CarriedOut Assault on
14, 2015),
Paris, Officials Say; Hollande Blames ISIS, N.Y. TimEs (Nov.
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/15/world/europe/paris-terrorist-attacks.html;
Associated Press, ParisAttacks Death Toll Rises to 130, HUFFINGTON POST: WORLDPost
(Nov. 20, 2015, 10:47 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/paris-attack-

death-toll us_564f3f7ee4b0d4093a57517f.
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France, attended by President Francois Hollande.' Subsequently, the
attackers bombed multiple popular restaurants and cafes, and the
conspiracy concluded with several explosions at the famed Bataclan
concert venue.' Though the 11/13 Paris Attacks came on the heels of
theJanuary 7, 2015, Charlie Hebdo Attacks, because the 11/13 Attacks
produced tenfold more victims,o some refer to it as "France's 9/11. ""
The Paris Attacks were, collectively, France's deadliest terror attack
and a critical existential impasse for the State. They compelled
President Hollande and his administration to make policy decisions
that have had, and will continue to have, deep cultural and
counterterror ramifications well beyond the horror of 11/13.12
Minutes after 11/13, the State heightened its urgency to combat
homegrown Muslim "radicalization" within France." The identity of
the culprits, combined with the Republic's ongoing struggle with
Islam, led the State to frame the 11/13 Attacks as a symbol of

8. Sam Borden, As Paris Attacks Unfolded, Players and Fans at Soccer Stadium
Remained Unaware, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
11/15/world/europe/stade-de-france-paris-soccer.html.
9. See Alexandra Zavis, "We Are Stronger Than They Are": First Paris Cafe Reopens
After TerroristAttack, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2015, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/
world/europe/la-fg-paris-attack-sites-20151207-story.html (describing the aftermath
of the attacks); see also FR. 24 ENGLISH, Deadly ParisAttacks CoordinatedBy Three Teams of
Terrorists,YOUTUBE (Nov. 14, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4x39hA8V
MWo (noting that the attacks were coordinated).
10. Khaled A. Beydoun, Muslims in the News Only When They're Behind the Gun, AL
JAZEERA (Jan. 9, 2015, 7:33 AM), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/

2015/01/muslims-france-charlie-hebdo-me-201518121649556792.html

(highlighting

the twelve deaths suffered in the Charlie Hebdo attacks).
11. Ian Hanchett, Ian Bremmer
"I Fear" "You'll See Increasingly Large Amounts of
Xenophobia and Populism" After Paris Attacks, BREITBART (Nov.
13, 2015),
http://www.breitbart.com/video/2015/11/13/ian-bremmer-i-fear-youll-see-increasinglylarge-amounts-of-xenophobia-and-populism-after-paris-attacks (quoting Ian Bremmer, the
president of an international political risk research and consulting firm).
12. See, e.g., ALEXANDRA DE Hoop SCHEFFER ET AL., THE GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF
THE U.S., AFTER THE TERROR ATTACKS OF 2015: A FRENCH AcTvIST FOREIGN POLICY

HERE TO STAY? 1 (2016), http://www.gmfus.org/file/7998/download (discussing
how France's shifts in foreign policy following the 11/13 Attacks will increase its
reliance on U.S. military leadership in the Middle East and North Africa); see also
infra Section III.A (discussing the impact of hardline assimilationist policies).
13. Radicalization is the process by which an individual adopts an extremist
ideology linked to terrorism. See Amna Akbar, Policing "Radicalization", 3 U.C. IRVINE
L. REv. 809, 811 (2013) [hereinafter Akbar, Policing "Radicalization']. Although not
explicitly associated with Islam, the term has been linked to Muslims, and counterradicalization efforts are primarily focused on Muslim communities. Id.
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increased radicalization within the "French Muslim community.""
The heightened urgency from the immediate wake of the November
Attacks moved President Hollande to declare, "To all those who have
seen these awful things, I want to say we are going to lead a war which
will be pitiless.""
Although France does not keep an official demographic tally of its
religious groups," a Pew Research Center study estimated the French
Muslim population was approximately 4.7 million in 2010.17 At nearly
eight percent of its aggregate polity, Islam is France's second largest
religion," and its Muslim population ranks as one of the biggest in
Consequently, the rising demographic, coupled with
Europe."

14.

See Nora Fellag, The Muslim Label: How French North Africans Have Become

"Muslims"and Not "Citizens", 13 J. ON ETHNOPOLITICS & MINORITY ISSUES IN FUR. 1, 3-4

(2014) (arguing that the conflation of France's significant Arab and Berber
populations, particularly from Algeria, has resulted in the framing of France's
Muslim community as monolithic, while in reality it is not a consolidated community
at all). For a comparative analysis of how formative immigration law and court
decisions in the United States from 1790 through 1952 viewed Arab and Muslim
identity as interchangeable, see generally Khaled A. Beydoun, Between Muslim and
White: The Legal Construction of Arab American Identity, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 29
(2013) [hereinafter Beydoun, Between Muslim and White].
15. Swati Sharma, "It Is Horror": French President Hollande's Remarks After Paris
Attacks, WASH. POST: WORLDVIEwS (Nov. 13, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/worldviews/wp/2015/11/13/it-is-horror-french-president-hollandes-remarksafter-paris-attacks/.
16. Bruce Crumley, Should France Count Its Minority Population?, TIME (Mar. 24,
2009), http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1887106,00.html.
Moreover, the National Assembly has removed the words "race" and "racial" from the
French Penal Code. See Khaled A. Beydoun, The French Kiss "Race" Goodbye, AL
JAZEERA (June 2, 2013), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/06/
20136273349196523.html [hereinafter Beydoun, French Kiss Race Goodbye] (analyzing
the legislation and its impact on French Muslims).
17. Conrad Hackett, 5 Facts About the Muslim Population in Europe, PEw RES. CTR.
(July 19, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/19/5-facts-aboutthe-muslim-population-in-europe/.
18. Id.; Deborah Potter, French Secularism, PBS: RELIGION & ETHICS NEWSWEEKLY
(June 24, 2011), http://www.pbs.org/wnet/religionandethics/2011/06/24/june-242011-french-secularism/9037 (attributing France's growing Muslim population
partially to the births of children and grandchildren of immigrants from Algeria in

the 1960s).
19. Hackett, supra note 17. I use the description "Muslim" in this Article as a
broad demographic term, not merely as a religious identity. See Olivier Roy, Islamic
Terrorist Radicalisation in Europe, in EUROPEAN ISLAM: CHALLENGES FOR PUBLIC POLICY
AND SOCIETY52, 60 (Samir Amghar et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter Roy, Islamic Terrorist
Radicalisation] (acknowledging that a "Western" Islam is a voluntary faith
community).
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France's colonial history and modem "culture war" with Islam,"
conflates fear of radicalization with Islam, manifested by and executed
against its established and still growing French Muslim citizenry.
French fear of Muslim radicalization is not only shaped by religion
but also race and gender. In line with embedded "Orientalist" tropes
and modern caricatures," fear of Muslim violence takes on a
specifically masculine and "Arab" form.2 ' Today, the bearded and
brooding recruit of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)"
occupies the primary discursive conception of the Muslim terrorist.2 5

20. For a historical account of the link between French colonialism and the
current era of domestic terrorism, see generally ANDREW HussEY, THE FRENCH
INTIFADA: THE LONG WAR BETWEEN FRANCE AND

rrs ARABS (2014).

21. See Claire Adida et al., Terror in France: Implications for Muslim Integration,
WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (Jan. 14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
monkey-cage/wp/2015/01/14/terror-in-france-implications-for-muslim-integration
(suggesting that recent terror attacks in France will only reinforce the "irrational"
association between Islam and radicalization).
22. See generally EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM (1978) (examining how the West
has framed the Arab and Muslim world as "The Orient," which is normatively
antithetical to the esteemed values associated with Europe and the United States,
dubbed "The Occident"). "We are witnessing the redeployment of old Orientalist
tropes," which saliently shape modern conceptions of terrorist threats. Leti Volpp,
The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1575, 1586-91 (2002); see also Beydoun,
Between Muslim and White, supra note 14 (addressing how these tropes shaped Arab
American identity).
23. The term "Arab" here is in line with its discursive and political application in
France, which encompasses Arabs, Amazigh, and Berber populations from the
"Maghreb," Turks, and other groups stereotyped under the Arab banner. Although
a sizable percentage of Muslims in France are Black (specifically, Sub-Saharan
African), they are excluded from the bona fide Muslim classification. See generally
Khaled A. Beydoun, Antebellum Islam, 58 How. L.J. 141 (2014) (examining the
erasure of Black Muslim identity in America partly as the result of the conflation of
Muslim-American identity with Arab-American identity).
24. ISIS is an anti-Western militant group seeking to create an independent
Islamic state in the Middle East. Nick Thompson et al., ISIS: Everything You Need to
Know About the Rise of the Militant Group, CNN (Feb. 10, 2015, 11:59 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/14/world/isis-everything-you-need-to-know
(explaining the history, leadership structure, and controlled territories of ISIS).
25. The overwhelming majority of Muslim terror culprits and state targets are
men, but females have not escaped scrutiny. For instance, Hasna Aitboulahcen, the
26-year-old who claimed to be the cousin of Abdelhamid Abaaoud and the suspected
head of the 11/13 Paris Attacks, was initially believed to have "detonated a suicide
vest as police stormed an apartment . .. as part of the search for those responsible for
planning and executing the attacks"; however, while neighbors suggest she claimed
to be a jihadi, police no longer suspect that she was responsible for the bombing.
Emaneulle Saliba et al., ParisAttacks: Who Was the Woman Killed in Terror Raid?, NBC
NEWS (Nov. 20, 2015, 1:13 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/paris-terrorattacks/who-was-female-paris-suicide-bomber-n466626.
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French "counter-radicalization" efforts,'2 in line with this masculine
conception of the Muslim terrorist, are almost entirely dedicated to
policing and prosecuting suspects who fit within this profile.
While Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) policing focuses on
the symbolic Arab Muslim male terrorist, the cultural assimilationist
policy punishes Muslim women by disparately infringing upon their
In 2004, the French Parliament infamously
religious freedoms.
banned the Muslim headscarf, or hijab," as part of an effort to
secularize France's Muslim population." Copycat legislation, within
and beyond Europe, followed France's "Headscarf Ban,""1 which the
French held as the lynchpin of its cultural assimilation campaign to
reform Islam and referee Muslim identity within France, 2 combatting
terror and preventing radicalization.
26. See Samuel J. Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam? The Law and Strategy of
Counter-Radicalization, 64 STAN. L. REV. 125, 126-27 (2012) ("[T]he core intuition
behind counter-radicalization is that the prevention of future violence requires
official involvement in shaping the ideational currents that are thought to underpin
that violence.").
27. See generally NAOMi DAVIDSON, ONLY MuSLiM: EMBODYING ISLAM IN TWENTIETHCENTURY FRANCE (2012) (analyzing sociologically how Muslim identity is conflated
with Arab and Maghrebi identity, and how Islam is radicalized along lines of
attendant ethnic caricatures to drive counterterrorism measures).
28. Ellen Wiles, Headscarves, Human Rights, and Harmonious Multicultural Society:
Implications of the FrenchBan for Interpretationsof Equality, 41 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 699, 704
(2007) (highlighting the State's notion that if one Muslim woman were to be
uprooted from her culture, the rest would, too, fall to assimilation).
29. Hijab directly translates to "barrier" or "partition," though it stands for the
broader concept of modesty in behavior and dress. Hijab, BBC (Mar. 9, 2009),
The most
http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/beliefs/hijab_1.shtml.
common form of hijab is the headscarf worn by Muslim women, though it also
encompasses the practice of completely covering the body except for the hands, face,
and feet. Id.
30. Jon Henley, French MPs Vote for Veil Ban in State Schools, GUARDIAN (Feb. 11,
2004, 3:35 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/feb/11/schools.scho
olsworldwide; see also France: Headscarf Ban Violates Religious Freedom, HUM. RTs.
7:00
PM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2004/
26,
2004,
WATCH
(Feb.
the
that
(explaining
02/26/france-headscarf-ban-violates-religious-freedom
headscarf ban disproportionately impacts Muslim women and girls).
31. European nations observing some type of headscarf ban include Belgium,
Turkey, and Denmark, in addition to some German, Italian, and Spanish cities, and
bans have been proposed in others. The Islamic Veil Across Europe, BBC NEWS (July 1,
2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13038095; see Sabrina Tavernise,
Turkey's High Court Overturns Headscarf Rule, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/06/world/europe/06turkey.html (reporting that
Turkey's high court rejected an amendment lifting the headscarf ban at universities
because it would go against the constitutional principle of secularism).
32. France's commitment to "reform" Islam is reflected by its establishment in
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Ten years later, following a string of terror attacks throughout
Europe and on French soil,3 3 the French Parliament responded by

passing a "Face Concealment Ban," outlawing the niqab or Islamic
face concealment." After its passage, the ban was immediately
challenged on religious liberty grounds; however, the European
Court of Human Rights upheld the Face Concealment Ban in July
2014, partially citing rising national security concerns.
Like its
predecessor, the Face Concealment Ban was another step towards the
State's attempt to secularize Islam"-a foundational principle
enshrined in its Constitution.
In France, cultural assimilation and counterterrorism policy do not
merely overlap, they are practically synonymous for the Muslim
population.3 ' The Headscarf and Face Concealment Bans, which
2002 of the Institut des cultures d'Islam (ICI), which is committed to secularizing Islam
and is an intellectual and political platform for pushing forward interventions that
advance France's cultural assimilation objectives. DAVIDSON, supra note 27, at 21114. But see Colette Davidson, Why French Military May Be More Tolerant of Muslims than
French Society, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 1, 2016), http://www.csmonitor.com/
World/Europe/2016/0301/Why-French-military-may-be-more-tolerant-of-Muslimsthan-French-society (outlining the French military's model of embracing religious
freedom). In addition, France proposed the "recruit[ment of] Islamic chaplains in
the army and prisons." Susanna Mancini, The Power of Symbols and Symbols as Power:
Secularism and Religion as Guarantorsof Cultural Convergence, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2629,
2645 (2009); see also Alexandria Sage, France Struggles to Fight Radical Islam in Its Jails,
REUTERS (May 7, 2013, 1:35 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-radicalis
ation-insight-idUSBRE94600Q20130507 (explaining that there are more than 160
Muslim chaplains in French prisons, but approximately 480 are needed).
33. See Timeline of Terror Attacks in Past 20 Years, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 7, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/timeline-of-terror-attacks-in-past-20-years-1420662841
[hereinafter Timeline of TerrorAttacks] (listing three terror attacks in France between
1995 and 2014).
34. See European Court Upholds French Full Veil Ban, BBC NEWS (July 1, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28106900 (explaining that the French law
imposes fines for wearing clothing intended to conceal the face in public).
35. Id.
36. Mancini, supra note 32, at 2642 ("France embodies the militant secularist
model par excellence, bent on keeping religion completely out of the public
sphere.").
37. 1958 CONST. art. 1 (Fr.) ("France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic
and social Republic. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without
distinction of origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs.").
38. French scholars argue against the notion that there is a spiritually or
politically monolithic Muslim community. See e.g., Olivier Roy, There Are More French
Muslims Working for French Security Than for Al Qaeda, HUFFTNGTON POST: WORLDPOST
(Jan. 9, 2015, 7:46 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/olivier-roy/paris-attackmuslim-cliches b_6445582.html [hereinafter Roy, French Muslims Working] ("There
are no signs pointing toward the beginning of the establishment of a Muslim political
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rank as the most strident per se responses to domestic and
Continental terrorism, are the symbolic and structural cornerstones
of the cultural assimilationist and counterterror model." Following
the Paris Attacks, and amid state efforts to expand and mainstream
CVE Policing strategy, these Bans manifest a counterterrorism regime
that (1) exacerbates tensions and disables the cultivation of strategic
relationships between law enforcement and France's Muslim
population, particularly in the Muslim-dominated and downtrodden
banlieues-,0 (2) stifles inroads within French Muslim communities,
emaciating the state's social capital within them; (3) undermines the
French Muslim "cooperation" vital for maximizing the effectiveness
of CVE Policing;" and, (4) weakens, in the long-term, successful
implementation of a "Micro-CVE Policing" model that polices the
secular seeds of individual deviance, instead of Islam as a faith and
Muslim spaces at large as the sources of radicalization.
While the CVE Policing model is riddled with theoretical problems
and fundamental civil liberties concerns," as examined in my
In France, there is not a Muslim
party... [and t]here is no 'Muslim vote.' ...
community, but a Muslim population."); see also supra note 14 and accompanying text
(noting that the Arab and Berber populations in France are often conflated).
39.

See Suzanne Daley & AlissaJ. Rubin, French Muslims Say Veil Bans Give Cover to

Bias, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/27/world/
europe/muslim-frenchwomen-struggle-with-discrimination-as-bans-on-veilsexpand.html (arguing that many French view the laws as a means "to defend the
traditions of French life").
40. Banlieues, or suburbs, have taken on a pejorative meaning and are associated
with slums occupied by immigrants of varying origins, including Muslim and African;
yet, there is enormous diversity within the banileues, which are often segregated
between the well-off suburbs and community housing projects. See George Packer,
The OtherFrance: Are the Suburbs of ParisIncubators of Terrorism?, NEW YORKER (Aug. 31,
2015), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/08/31/the-other-france
(discussing the alienation within the banileues as an "acute problem that the
republic has neglected for decades"). For a widely cited modern account of the
development of the banlieues, formed to accommodate the emerging French Muslim
community, see generally GILLES KEPEL, LEs BANLIEUES DE L'ISLAM (1987).
41. See Aziz Z. Huq, The Social Production of National Security, 98 CoRNELL L. REv.
637, 685 (2013) (noting that long-term cooperation better reduces individuals'
motivation to join terror groups and pursue violence, as opposed to targeted actions
to intervene on a specific act of terrorism); see supra notes 28-37 and accompanying
text (applying the concept specifically to headscarf and face veil bans).
42. "Micro-CVE Policing," distinguished from prevailing "Macro-CVE Policing"
approaches, phrases of my coinage, are narrowly tailored to focus on the specific
structural roots that give rise to individual deviant actors. Infra Section II.B.
43. While critical of the CVE Policing model and philosophy-specifically, its
core baseline tying Muslim identity with suspicion of terrorism-this Article does not
thoroughly examine CVE Policing; but rather, it surveys France's deepening
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research," and the scholarship of notable "CVE scholars,"4 5 this
Article analyzes the strategic flaws with "Macro-CVE Policing." As a
first step, this Article proceeds with a general analysis of the
challenges the State will face when implementing CVE Policing
measures and initiatives.
These measures, along the lines of
counterterror policing structure and strategy, clash with hardline
cultural assimilationist philosophy symbolized by the Headscarf and
Face Concealment Bans."
Strict secularism frees France from the First Amendment free
exercise and establishment of religion concerns that constrain U.S.
CVE Policing methods.4 7
Instead of constitutional constraints,
France's challenges are acutely tied to its hardline culturalassimilation policies and state-framing that views French identity as
irreconcilable with Muslim identity."

commitment to CVE Policing in conjunction with its cultural assimilation model, and
subsequently analyzes how the aims of the former are compromised by the execution
of the latter. My research echoes Rik Coolsaet's indictment of CVE Policing as "illdefined, complex[,] and controversial." Rik Coolsaet, Counterterrorism and Counterradicalisationin Europe: How Much Unity in Diversity , in JIHADI TERRORISM AND THE
RADICALISATION CHALLENGE:

EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN EXPERIENCEs

227, 240 (Rik

Coolsaet ed., 2d ed. 2011). However, in light of its emergence as the preferred
counterterrorism model in France, I conclude that both the interests of the State and
French Muslims will be advanced instead by coupling CVE Policing with cultural
integrationist strategies. I also echo the position of French scholar and public
intellectual Olivier Roy, who is critical of the CVE Policing model because it is based
on monitoring Muslim communities at large, instead advocating for policing based
on deviant individual trajectories. See, e.g., Roy, French Muslims Working, supra note 38
(noting that radicalized youths do not come from the traditional religious
community but "from the periphery of the Muslim world").
44. See Khaled A. Beydoun, Between Indigence, Islamophobia and Erasure: Poor and
Muslim in "War on Terror"America, 104 CALIF. L. REv. (forthcoming 2016) [hereinafter
Beydoun, Indigence, Islamophobia and Erasure] (analyzing how the disproportionate
targeting of indigent Muslim communities in the United States affects their
constitutional rights).
45. Most notably scholarship from Amna Akbar, Sahar Aziz, Aziz Huq, Samuel
Rascoff, and Olivier Roy, which are cited prominently within this Article.
46. Part III of this Article provides policy proposals linked to carrying forward a
more sustainable CVE Policing regime tied to the critiques advanced by prominent
French scholars and political analysts.
47. See generally Rascoff, supra note 26, at 173-79 (examining how enforcement of
CVE Policing, and its subsequent state iteration of "official Islam" and classification of
militant or "bad Muslims," encroaches on the First Amendment's Establishment Clause).
48. Fellag, supra note 14, at 9 (highlighting, for example, headscarves and face
veils as an integral component of Islamic cultural tradition and noting the French
Bans are an attempt to westernize French Muslims).
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The convergence of the cultural assimilationist and CVE Policing
counterterrorism models spawn considerable programmatic and
strategic conflicts. These conflicts strongly suggest that effective
expansion of French CVE Policing would be facilitated by the
retrenchment of the cultural assimilation approach, and per the
policy proposals of this Article, reassessment of its legislative
lynchpins: The Headscarf and Face Concealment Bans.
Indeed, an interest convergence of state counterterrorism objectives
with the free exercise of religion would spur goodwill dissolution of the
Bans and the softening of hardline assimilationist policies, ultimately
accomplishing the anti-radicalization that France seeks."
Mitigating tension and building amicable relationships between
French Muslim communities and the State are pivotal in preventing
radicalization within and beyond them. The most effective policy
means for enhancing CVE Policing requires reconsideration of the
Headscarf and Face Concealment Bans. Proponents of the Bans may
dismiss this proposal on grounds that it eschews state adherence to
"liberti, igalit, fraterniti," the Republic's core principles."o Building
inroads, developing social capital, and cultivating trust between state
police and the French Muslim communities, however, are vital to the
success of CVE Policing. More saliently, a CVE Policing model that
targets individual deviance instead of collectively and collaterally
punishing the entirety of France's Muslim community.
Amid the immediate aftermath of the Paris Attacks and a fluidly
shifting French counterterror program, this Article contributes to
the
two, intimately overlapped, bodies of legal scholarship:
criminalization of Muslim identity in France and the global
By fusing together these areas of
expansion of CVE Policing.
research, this Article seeks to make three contributions to both
First, this Article brings newfound
bodies of legal literature.
relevance to the rich body of legal and social-science research
examining the counterterror aims and effects of the French
assimilationist approach, which became prolific after 2004's
Headscarf Ban.

49. Cf Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the
Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REv. 518, 524 (1980) (arguing that school
desegregation benefitted the United States politically and economically-beyond the
issues of racial inequality-at home and abroad).
50. This French motto, meaning "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," first spread
during the Age of Enlightenment and survives as an integral part of French heritage.
Liberty, Equality, Fraternity,FR. UNTED STATES (Nov. 30, 2007), http://franceintheus.
org/spip.php?article620.
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Second, this Article is tied to the emerging body of legal literature
examining CVE Policing and counter-radicalization programs at
large, in the United States and beyond.
By exploring France's
expansion of CVE Policing after the Paris Attacks, this Article uncovers
how emerging counterterror philosophies and strategies clash with
underlying constitutional and legal baselines core to a state's identity
and-as in France-oblige major policy negotiations and reform.
Third, the emergence of ISIS and today's blurred lines between
international and domestic terrorism have spawned greater
collaboration between American
and French counterterror
agencies." This enhanced collaboration, born out of mutual concern
for ISIS and other terror networks and their influence on Muslim
citizens, signals greater alignment of counterterror philosophy and
strategy. Such an alignment provides greater understanding of the
ebbs and flows of the French CVE Policing model beyond the Paris
Attacks and the American model after tragedies such as the
December 2, 2015, mass shooting in San Bernardino, California.
Part I analyzes the formative and modern understandings of the
masculine Muslim terror threat, mapping the gradual development
of the State's current concern with homegrown
Muslim
Part II juxtaposes the established state cultural
radicalization.
assimilationist counterterror model, spearheaded and symbolized by
the Headscarf and Face Concealment Bans in modern France, with
the State's enhanced commitment to CVE Policing following the
growing fear of homegrown radicalization. Part III examines how the
cultural assimilation counterterror model philosophy conflicts with, if
not undermines, the stated goals of CVE Policing. Closing with policy
prescriptions, Part III examines how the dissolution of the Headscarf
and Face Concealment Bans will benefit CVE Policing, followed by
social science-driven proposals for shaping a more sustainable and
effective CVE Policing regime for France moving forward.

51. See, e.g., Dan Lamothe, PentagonPromises to Boost Intelligence Sharing with France
After
Paris Attacks,
WASH.
POsT:
CHECKPOINT
(Nov.
16,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/11/16/pentagonpromises-to-boost-intelligence-shaing-with-france-after-paris-attacks
(reporting on
U.S. intelligence agencies' commitment to more closely share information with the
French following the 11/13 Paris Attacks).
52. The attack on a party by a "radicaliz[ed]" Muslim couple killed fourteen and
injured twenty-one. Paloma Esquivel et al., Obama: "This Was an Act of Terrorism
Designed to Kill Innocent People", L.A. TIMEs (Dec. 6, 2015, 5:27 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-In-san-bernardino-terror-probe-widensas-obama-set-to-speak-20151206-story.html.
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FROM RIOTERS TO RADICALS

"What is dangerous is not minarets, but cellars and garages that keep
clandestine religious groups hidden."
-Nicolas

Sarkozy53

"[T]he most dangerouscreation of any society is th[e] man who has nothing to
lose."
-James Baldwin54
The Paris Attacks ushered in an unprecedented state of fear of
The Attacks, which
Islam, or "Islamophobia,"5 5 inside France.
unfolded during a protracted campaign to reform Islam and
assimilate France's Muslim citizenry," moved the State to bolster its
commitment to CVE Policing. Preceded by a string of terrorist
attacks on French and European soil-less than one percent of which
Europol reports were committed by Muslim radicals or "Islamists" in
2014 5 -the scale of the Paris Attacks have stoked considerable fear of
homegrown Muslim radicalization in France. This fear has expedited

THE REPUBLIc, RELIGIONS AND HOPE (Khaled Beydoun trans., 2004).
54. Letter From a Region in My Mind, NEW YORKER (Nov. 17, 1962),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1962/11/17/letter-from-a-region-in-my-mind.
55. "Islamophobia" is political and societal animus toward Islam, Muslims, and
individuals stereotyped as Muslims, in addition to state-sponsored policies that
associate Islam and Muslims broadly with national security threats. See Islamophobia:
The Right Word for a Real Problem, GEO. U.: BRIDGE INMATIVE (Apr. 26, 2015, 5:56 PM),
http://bridge.georgetown.edu/islamophobia-the-right-word-for-a-real-problem
(tracing the origins of the term and arguing that it is necessary to label prejudice so
that it may be recognized and challenged). I define Islamophobia more specifically
as, "the presumption that Islam is inherently violent, alien and inassimilable, and
expressions of Muslim identity correlative with a propensity for terrorism.
Islamophobia is rooted in understandings of Islam as civilizational antithesis, and
perpetuated by government structures and private citizens. Finally, Islamophobia is
also the process, and namely, the dialectic by which state policies targeting Muslims
endorse prevailing stereotypes, and in turn, embolden private animus toward Muslim

53.

subjects." Khaled A. Beydoun, Islamophobia: Toward a Legal Definition and Framework,

116 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE (forthcoming 2016).
56. See e.g., DAVIDSON, supra note 27, at 211-16 (highlighting the ICI as a key
component of France's cultural assimilation strategy).
57. See EUROPOL, EUROPEAN UNION TERRORISM SITUATION AND TREND REPORT 18,
40-41 (2015), https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/p_
europol-tsatl5-09junl5_low-rev.pdf (noting that although about one percent of
terrorist attacks were "religiously inspired," about fifty percent of all arrests were for
religiously motivated terrorism).
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the State's shift toward the CVE Policing model, which was first
implemented in the UK and is rapidly expanding in the United States.5 8
Although the vast majority of terror attacks were not motivated by
politicized Muslim aims or Muslim culprits, 5 French counterterror
policies have been designed to combat Muslim terrorism.' These
policies are consistent with the State's preoccupation with foreign
and, more increasingly, homegrown masculine Muslim terrorism."
This fear's modern roots are the Paris Riots of 2005, when throngs of
youths from the Muslim-concentrated banlieues stormed the streets
and tangled with law enforcement.6 2
Section A tracks the development of this preoccupation and fear of
homegrown Muslim radicals, which became discursively and
politically robust after the 2005 Paris Riots and, indeed, reached
unprecedented heights following the Paris Attacks. Section B
examines the counterterror measures enacted to prevent and police
the perceived Muslim threat, focusing on the cultural assimilationist
and CVE Policing models.
A.

The Banlieue and the Belly of Homegrown Threat

In 2005, the banlieues on the outskirts of Paris exploded with riots
led by area youths." Almost a year after the Headscarf Ban, young
men from these segregated and indigent" African and Muslim-

58.

See generally Akbar, Policing "Radicalization",supra note 13 (analyzing hardline

CVE Policing structures and strategies in the United States and the First Amendment
concerns these strategies specifically pose to Muslim American communities); see also
Beydoun, Indigence, Islamophobia and Erasure, supra note 44 (describing CVE Policing
pilot programs launched in Boston, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis, and their
disparate impact on indigent and working class Muslim communities).
59. See EUROPOL, supra note 57, at 8, 40 (noting that only two attacks in the
European Union in 2014 were "religiously inspired").
60. See supra text accompanying note 39 (describing the Headscarf and Face
Concealment Bans as cornerstones of France's counterterror policies).
61. The international and domestic terrorism labels are not meant to form a
rigid binary. As examined in Part III, these two classifications overlap and, with the
emergence of ISIS, are often blurred by the State.
62.

See Craig S. Smith, Immigrant Rioting Flares in Francefor Ninth Night, N.Y. TIMES

(Nov. 5, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/05/world/europe/immigrantrioting-flares-in-france-for-ninth-night.html (describing the riots as "France's worst
urban violence in a decade").
63. Id.
64. See Mancini, supra note 32, at 2662 ("Muslims in Europe generally appear to
suffer higher levels of residential segregation, high levels of homelessness, poorer
quality housing conditions, poorer residential neighborhoods, and comparatively
greater vulnerability and insecurity in their housing status.").
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dominated enclaves clashed with National and City Police within the
belly of these ghettoes. Seventeen days of rioting ensued, sparked by
the combined powder-keg of structural poverty, unemployment,"
"the lack of opportunity and stifling conditions,"' and the deaths of a
fifteen-year-old boy of Malian descent and a seventeen-year-old boy of
Tunisian descent as they fled police."7 The two victims were both young
Muslim men from the northeastern Paris suburb of Clichy-Sous-Bois."
The vast majority of youths who subsequently stormed the streets were
also Muslims from that neighborhood or other banlieues similarly
riddled by poverty, lack of opportunity, and police violence."
The 2005 Paris Riots were a major political flashpoint for the
Republic and its Muslim citizens. Specifically, the images projected
onto television screens and printed in newspapers, and the rhetoric
delivered by politicians and pundits, reformed discursive and state
perceptions of Muslim threat.70 Before the Riots, Muslim terrorists
were generally believed to be foreign agents, deviant actors associated
with transnational terror networks operating beyond France's

65. JOHN R. BOWEN,

WHY THE FRENCH DON'T LIKE HEADSCARVES:

ISLAM, THE STATE,

248 (2007) ("The riots that enflamed France in the fall of 2005
brought to the world's attention how far France has yet to go in fighting the high
rates of unemployment and discrimination faced by residents of the poor
suburbs. . . ."). For a concise history of the structural poverty, unemployment, and
poor housing pervasive in the banlieues, see Sophie Body-Gendrot, France Upside
Down over A Headscar?,68 Soc. OF REuGION 289, 297-98 (2007). Unemployment and
un-employability are especially pronounced among Muslim youth inside the Paris
suburbs. "More than [twenty percent] of the residents of Clichy and Montfermeil
The
leave school without a diploma (about 150,000 people per year) ....
unemployment rate for Muslim youth in the suburbs of Paris is around [forty-three
AND PUBLIC SPACE

percent]." Soeren Kern, French Suburb Becoming "SeparateIslamic Societies", GATESTONE
INST. (Oct. 10, 2011, 4:45 AM), http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/2487/frenchsuburbs-islamic-societies.
66. Fellag, supra note 14, at 1.
67. Fresh Violence Hits Paris Suburbs, BBC NEWS (Nov. 3, 2005, 3:33 PM),

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4401670.stm;

see also French Police Trial, supra

note 3 (focusing on the trial of the police officers who chased the two boys into a
power substation where they were electrocuted).
68.

French Police Trial, supra note 3.

69. Fellag, supra note 14, at 1-2.
70. For a brief synopsis of how French media projects the Islamophobic
sentiment and political strategy of the National Front party, see Richard Seymour,
Far-Right Feasts on France's Unchecked Islamophobia, AL JAZEERA (Dec. 16,

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/12/feasts-france-uncheckedislamophobia-151215122050269.html.

2015),
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boundaries.71 The Riots, however, supplanted fears of the terrorist
outsider with the homegrown radical.
Following the Riots, the homegrown radical was caricatured in the
7
very image of the young banlieusard.
'
The State contended that
French Muslim youths of African and, specifically, Arab visage, who
were fully immersed in French life but simultaneously vulnerable to
the lure of jihad, were within the reach of foreign terrorist
organizations.
In addition, the Riots intersected with an ongoing
narrative that "Islam is gaining ground in France where Christianity
has ... declined,"7 seeding fears of religious radicalization among
Muslims within a state that mandates secularism.
The common corpus of underlying ethnic tropes enabled the
political shift from wayward jeunes ethniques77 to homegrown radicals.
During the Riots, images of young Muslim men setting cars ablaze,
disobeying curfews, clashing with policemen, and openly slandering
the State and the Tricolour,7 were ubiquitous.7 ' This growing wave of
rebellious young Muslim men during the Riots and in their
immediate aftermath was initially profiled as criminal threats by the
State." They were called "scum" by then President Nicolas Sarkozy.8 1

71. Pamela Engel, Why France Has Become a Prime Target for Terrorists, Bus. INSIDER
(Nov. 14, 2015, 12:35 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/paris-attacks-why-terrori
sts-target-france-2015-1 1.

72.
YOUTH

DIDER BIGO ET AL., EUR. PARLIAMENT, PREVENTING AND COUNTERING
RADICALISATION IN THE EU 16 (2014), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/

But see

RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2014/509977/IPOL-LIBEET(2014)509977_EN.pdf
(cautioning that governments may be overestimating how new technology has led to
"self-radicalization" by those who would not otherwise have radicalized).
73. A "banlieusard" is a resident of a banlieue.
74. Fellag, supra note 14, at 1-2.
75. Yaroslav Trofimov, Islamic State's Scariest Success: Attracting Western Newcomers,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 26, 2015, 8:46 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-statesscariest-success-attracting-western-newcomers-1424932279.
76. Michele Tribalat & Gerard Mauger, France, Islam and the Banlieues: A Debate
on the Place of Islam and Class in the Suburbs, GUARDIAN (Nov. 1, 2011, 10:02 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/201 1/nov/01/france-debate-classislam-banlieues (noting that the immigration and birth rates among Muslims are
high, while younger generations of French origin are increasingly secularized).
77. Jeunes ethniques means ethnic youths.
78. Tricolouris a nickname for the French State Flag.
79. SeeJennifer Heider, Note, Unveiling the Truth Behind the French Burqa Ban: The
Unwarranted Restriction of the Right to Freedom of Religion and the European Court of
Human Rights, 22 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 93, 102 (2012) ("It is estimated that, as a
result of the riots, 10,000 cars were burned, 300 buildings were damaged, 220 police
officers were injured, and over 6,000 people were arrested.").

80.

Id.
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Similarly, French media and political figures branded them "thugs,"
"criminals," and "gangs," 2 labels that emanate from discursive and
political understandings of the masculine Muslim identity as violent
and warmongering,8 3 unruly, and members of an "enemy race."
Al Qaeda's emergence onto the international scene," followed by
ISIS several years later, however, has refrained perceptions of young,
poor Muslim men as prospective radicals and unripe terrorists."
Again, the rapid reclassification of the French Muslim men in the
banlieues was easy for politicians and pundits to make because the
core ethnic tropes of the criminal Muslim street thug aligned with the
discursive and political imaginings of the Muslim extremist.
Leadership within France's primary counterterror agencies
believed that the political dissidence of the Muslim men in the
banlieues, combined with their religious identities, made them ripe for
A number of
recruitment by transnational terror networks."
sociologists argue that actors within France, particularly nationalist
elements on the right, view "Islam-origin immigrants and minorities

81.

Ed Vulliamy, Paris Attacks: In 1986 France United. Can It Find Common Cause

Again?, GuARDIAN (Jan. 10, 2015, 3:50 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/20
15/jan/10/paris-attacks-france-liberal-left-protest-arabs.
82. Leland Ware, Color-Blind Racism in France: Bias Against Ethnic Minority
Immigrants, 46 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 185, 186 (2014) ("Young banlieusards (banlieue

residents) are stereotyped as gang members, criminals, and potential terrorists. They
are regarded as 'immigrants' even though many of them are second and third
generation citizens born in France."); see CATHY LISA SCHNEIDER, POLICE POWER AND
RAcE RIOTS: URBAN UNREST IN PARIS AND NEW YORK 180-95 (2014) (discussing the
Riots and popular perceptions of the rioters during and in their wake).
83.

Beydoun, Between Muslim and White, supra note 14, at 47-48.

84.

See JOHN TEHRANIAN, WHITEWASHED:

AMfERIcA's INVISIBLE MIDDLE EASTERN

MINORITY 68-72 (2009) (describing the views of American immigrants from the
Middle East over previous generations); John Tehranian, Performing Whiteness:
Naturalization Litigation and the Construction of Racial Identity in America, 109 YALE L.J.
817, 837, 841 (2000) (highlighting the embedded religious and cultural tropes

American immigrants from the Arab World and the Middle East faced during
naturalization proceedings, where-from 1790 to 1952-they had to prove they met
the statutory definition of whiteness).
85. See MARC SAGEMAN, UNDERSTANDING TERROR NETWORKS 1 (2004) (describing
the origins and goals of the jihad terror movement). See generally Olivier Roy, Al
Qaeda in the West as a Youth Movement: The Power of a Narrative2 (MICROCON Policy
[hereinafter Roy, Al Qaeda Youth Movement],
Working Paper 2, 2008)
http://www.microconflict.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/PWP2-OR.pdf
(examining Al Qaeda's reach and resonance in Europe).
86. France: Extremism & Counter-Extremism, COUNTER EXTREMISM PROJECT 1, 2, 5,
http://www.counterextremism.com/countries/france (last visited Aug. 17, 2016).

87.

Id. at 6-7.
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in France as a single 'monolithic community.'"" Similar to within the
United States, "Muslim" and "Arab" are used interchangeably in
France. 9 This conflation embeds popular views that Arabs and
Muslims are one in the same; that the French Muslim population
does not include converts, Sub-Saharan Africans, whites, and other
non-Arab groups."'
As such, the once riotous banlieues are today's sites for radical
recruitment. Parisian banlieues alone, particularly those within the St.
Denis District,9 ' source a considerable segment of the twenty-five
percent of the French fighters in Iraq and Syria that come from the
Paris region." The majority of these fighters is in their twenties and
lured abroad or driven to engage in homegrown terrorism from
social disaffection, culture of violence, and "generational nihilism,"
which grips this demographic." A nihilism that spurred protests and
riots and, with the growing influence of terror networks in France,
incited homegrown terror attacks.
B.

Modern TerrorAttacks

"For the greater the hostility toward Muslims in Europe and the deeper the
West becomes involved in military action in the Middle East, the closer ISIS
comes to its goal of creating and managingchaos."
-Scott

Atran and Nafees Hamid"

The Paris Attacks are the latest in a series of domestic and
Continental terror attacks orchestrated by French Muslim culprits.

88. Fellag, supra note 14, at 3.
89. Beydoun, Between Muslim and White, supra note 14, at 43-44.
90. See JONATHAN LAURENCE & JUSTIN VAISSE, Being Muslim in France, in
INTEGRATING ISLAM 21 (2006), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/
2016/07/integratingislam-chapter.pdf (breaking down Muslim demographics in
France by origin).
91. See id. at 37 (observing that the St. Denis District is a North Paris suburb
where nearly half a million foreigners live).
92. Atran & Hamid, supra note 2 (citing Daniel Milton, The French Foreign Fighter
Threat in Context, COMBATING TERRORISM CTR. W. PoINT (Nov. 14, 2015),
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/ctc-perspectives-the-french-foreign-fighter-threatin-context).
93. Roy, Islamic Terrorist Radicalisation, supra note 19, at 58; Olivier Roy, What Is
the Driving Force Behind Jihadist Terrorism? A Scientific Perspective on the
Causes/Circumstances ofJoining the Scene, BKA AUrUMN CONF. 10 (Nov. 18, 2015)
[hereinafter Roy, Driving Force].
94. Atran & Hamid, supra note 2.
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These attacks, all committed within the last twenty years, have
intensified fear of homegrown French Muslim radicals. Although only
a small fraction of the aggregate terror attacks and mass shootings were
committed by Muslim culprits, 95 state counterterror messaging and
programming have centered on fearing Muslim radicals and their
terror threat at a far higher clip than non-Muslims threats."
The first major attack by a Muslim culprit was in 1995; the bombing
at the Saint-Michel subway station in Paris, which killed eight people
and injured more than 150," commenced state fear of homegrown
Muslim terror. The culprit of the attack, Rachid Ramda, was an
Algerian national with ties to the Armed Islamic Group, a network
based in Algeria."
Sixteen years later, six months before the Headscarf Ban, terrorists
set their sights on Madrid's subway system. On March 11, 2004, a
group of Muslim men with links to Al Qaeda planted a series of bombs,
which ripped through four commuter trains, killing more than 190
people." That attack, commonly referred to as "3/11," still ranks as
the biggest terror attack on European soil in terms of the number
killed.'" Although 3/11 took place in Spain, President Chirac framed
it as a domestic attack, using it to drive support for the ban on Muslim
headscarves, which was ultimately enacted in later that year."'
Eight months later, fear of Muslim terror in Europe reached an
even higher pitch when Mohammed Bouyeri, a Dutch-Moroccan
Muslim, murdered Theo van Gogh, a well-known Dutch filmmaker and
fierce critic of Islam. 02 The political and religious dimensions of van

95. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (noting that only about one percent
of terrorist attacks were "religiously inspired").
96. The imagined Muslim threat, as indicated by the scale and resources
dedicated to counterterror programming in Europe, is far greater than the actual
threat. Id.
97. Timeline of TerrorAttacks, supra note 33.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Alan Riding, Bombings in Madrid: Paris;France Reports Threat from an Islamic
Group, N.Y. TIMEs (Mar. 17, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/17/world/bo
mbings-in-madrid-paris-france-reports-threat-from-an-islamic-group.html (quoting
President Chirac days after the Madrid bombings as saying that France, which had in
the past "paid a high and painful price for terrorism," had no specific threats against
it, "but, like all democracies, it is not safe from terrorist acts").
102. Marlise Simons, Dutch Filmmaker, an Islam Critic, Is Killed, N.Y. TImES (Nov. 3,
2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/03/world/europe/dutch-filmmaker-anislam-critic-is-killed.html; see also Van Gogh Murder Suspect Confesses to Killing, NBC
NEWS (July 12, 2005, 1:48 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/8551653/ns/world-ne
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Gogh's murder, combined with the religious and ethnic identity of
Bouyeri, elevated the murder into an act of terror in the minds of
Furthermore, it also reignited
French and European policymakers?'
questions of whether Islam itself could be reconciled with the liberal
principles enshrined by France and other European states; and
concomitantly, whether the Continent's growing Muslim population
could be integrated into modem European societies."o' Van Gogh's
murder provided proponents further justification for the Headscarf
Ban; moreover, it mobilized greater support for Jean-Marie La Pen and
the National Front party-a party that moved from the fringe into the
spotlight of French politics by centering on its anti-Muslim platform.'
French concern with the rising threat of "Islamic extremism, "106
most notably Al Qaeda until 2012-and ISIS today 1 -was also
influenced by the September 11th terror attack in the United

ws/t/van-gogh-murder-suspect-confesses-killing (reporting that Bouyeri asserted that
his actions were religiously motivated).
103. Dutch individuals with dual citizenship who join a terror group are now
stripped of their Dutch citizenship. Hanne Cokelaere, The Netherlands to Strip Dual
Citizens of Nationality If They join ISIL, PoLrrco (May 25, 2016, 11:54 AM),
http://www.politico.eu/article/netherlands-to-strip-dual-citizens-of-nationality-ifthey-join-isil (noting that President Hollande withdrew a similar proposal in France
after protests). For a discussion of Bouyeri and the political and legal ramifications
of van Gough's murder, see Jason Burke, The Murder That Shattered Holland's Liberal
Dream, GUARDIAN (Nov. 7, 2004, 7:09 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2004/nov/07/terrorism.religion.
104. This debate became prominent in both the media and academic discourses,
including legal literature. For a discussion on the integration of immigrants and
Muslims in Germany, see generally Cem Ozdemir, Germany's Integration Challenge, 30
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 221 (2006).
105. This popularity of the National Front is again rising after the French attacks;
known for its strident stance against Islam and Muslims immigrants and having a
narrow construction of French citizenship, the party capitalizes off of terror attacks
to push forward these platforms. Kim Willsher, Front National Has Chance to Take
Centre Stage After Paris Attacks, GUARDIAN (Nov. 14, 2015, 2:24 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/14/paris-terror-attacks-fn-far-rightle-pen-front-national [hereinafter Willsher, Front National]; see France Elections:
NationalFrontLeads in RegionalPolls, BBC NEWS (Dec. 6, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-europe-35018849 (illustrating how the Party's message resonated with
voters in regional elections following the 11/13 Paris Attacks).
106. This term is used interchangeably with Islamism, Muslim extremism, Islamic
fundamentalism, and other analogs that conflate conservative interpretations of
Islam with terrorism.
107. See Sharma, supra note 15 (quoting President Hollande's speech given
immediately after the Paris Attacks declaring a "pitiless" war against ISIS).
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States."os Muslim-led attacks on French and European soil gave the
threat a more looming, proximate feel, adorned with homegrown faces.
Attacks such as "7/7"-the London Attack of 2005'"-and the 3/11
Attack in Madrid stood as reminders of the reoccurring proliferation of
male Muslim terror threats"o and vivid signals of growing
radicalization and imminent terror attack inside of France's borders.
Politicians, led by the ascending National Front party and its
bellicose leader, Le Pen, used these attacks to push additional policies
targeting France's Muslims."' In particular, the National Front and its
sympathizers eyed the niqab, as well as other modes of face concealment
worn by Muslim women, as the next cultural assimilationist measure that
would further estrange French and Muslim identity-leading to the
niqab's banning in September 2010. "1
However, the Face Concealment Ban did not have the intended
effect, and attacks carried out by French Muslims continued. One
such attack, known as the "Merah Affair," took place roughly two
years after the Face Concealment Ban was enacted."'3 In March 2012,
Mohamed Merah, an Arab Frenchman claiming association with Al
Qaeda, killed three Jewish schoolchildren, a rabbi, and three French
soldiers."' This attack was a boiling point for the State.
Merah's purported Al Qaeda ties and the State's fears of the
terrorist group's reach into ' France triggered the formal
counterterrorism policy shift toward CVE Policing."' This strategic

108.

See Amaney Jamal, Civil Liberties and the Otherization of Arab and Muslim

Americans, in RACE AND ARAB AMERIcANs BEFORE AND AFTER 9/11:

FROM INVISIBLE

CITIZENS TO VISIBLE SUBJEcTs 114, 117-18 (Amaney Jamal & Nadine Naber eds.,
2008) (analyzing how Arab and Muslim identity were directly and deeply implicated
as a threat after 9/11); see also Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights,
and Immigration Law After September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58
N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 295, 297-99 (2002) (discussing America's comprehensive
counterterror policies enacted by the George W. Bush administration in the wake of
9/11, and their impact on civil liberties).
109. 7July London Bombings: What Happened that Day?, BBC NEWS (July 3, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-33253598 (recounting that, on July 7, 2005, four
British Muslims coordinated suicide bombings in London's bus and subway lines,
killing fifty-two).
110. The London Attack was the third targeting underground European subway
systems, preceded by the 1995 Attack in Paris and 3/11.
111. Willsher, FrontNationa4 supra note 105.
112. See infra Section II.A.2 (discussing the Face Concealment Ban).
113. Timeline of TerrorAttacks, supra note 33.
114. Id.
115. Francesco Ragazzi, Towards "PolicedMulticulturalism"? Counter-Radicalizationin
France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, LES ETUDES DU CERI 3, 10 (2014).
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shift toward CVE Policing was accelerated on May 24, 2014, when
Muslim Frenchman Mehdi Nemmouche killed four people inside a
Jewish museum in Brussels, Belgium.1 1 6 The "Nemmouche Affair," as
the attack became known in France, linked ISIS fears with the waves
of Syrian refugees pushed into France, specifically because
Nemmouche spent about a year in Syria.' For the State, the Merah
Affair signaled Al Qaeda's growing influence with France's Muslims,
while the Nemmouche Affair symbolized the increasing influence of
ISIS, the threat du jour, inside the Republic and the Muslim
concentrated banlieues."8
An attack by two gunmen on the Paris office of the satirical
magazine Charlie Hebdo ended with the killing of twelve people on
January 7, 2015."' Five more people died during the gunmen's
escape and subsequent capture two days later. 120 The attack on the
magazine, which routinely published inflammatory content about
Islam, and most notably, the Prophet Mohammed,12 ' reignited public
and political debates about Islam's place in France,1 2 and whether
France's sizable Muslim population could be culturally assimilated
and their "no-go zone" communities melded into broader society.'2 3

116. John Thor-Dahlburg & Elaine Ganley, French Suspect Held in Belgian Jewish
Museum Shootings Spent a Recent Year in Syria, Prosecutor Says, WASH. POST (June 1,
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/french-suspect-held-in-belgian-jewis
h-museum-shootings-spent-a-recent-year-in-syria-prosecutor-says/2014/06/01/d27e0
428-e9c2-11e3-93d2-edd4belf5d9e-story.html.
117. Id. (stating that the Nemmouche Affair "crystaliz[ed] fears that European
radicals will parlay their experiences in Syria into terrorism back home").
118. As a result, ISIS emerged into the most salient manifestation of terrorism
within the minds of the citizenry and the halls of the State. Consequently, ISIS
trumped Al Qaeda as state enemy number one, and France's counterterror policy
and parlance shifted from terrorism and toward radicalization in line with the
demographic threat posed by it. Ragazzi, supra note 115, at 4.
119. Charlie Hebdo Attack: Three Days of Terror, BBC NEWS (Jan. 14, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30708237.
120. Id.
121. See Kelsey Lucas, Here Are the Translated Charlie Hebdo Covers, DAILY SIGNAL (Jan.
8, 2015), http://dailysignal.com/2015/01/08/translated-charlie-hebdo-covers (featuring
caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed on the magazine's cover multiple times).
122. Carla Power, Why There's Tension Between France and Its Muslim Population,TIME
(Jan. 8, 2015), http://time.com/3659241/paris-terror-attack-muslim-islam/.
123. See Karl de Vries, ParisAttacks PromptFearsFrance'sMuslim "No-Go" Zones Incubating
jihad, Fox NEwS (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/01/12/parisattacks-prompt-fears-france-muslim-no-go-zones-incubating-jihad.html (arguing that the
"no-go zones" are sensitive urban zones that "resemble poor sections of America's cities
where gangs rule, crime and drugs are rampant[,] ... police only enter with significant
backup," and are a breeding ground for radicalism).
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These questions, which were already at the center of French political
and societal discourse before the Charlie Hebdo Attack, stoked fears of
ISIS's apocalyptic vision and the homegrown radicalization it inspired,
leading to the State's adoption of formal CVE Policing policies.' 2 4
These influences continued to take hold, as attacks in France
increasingly mirrored attacks carried out by Al Qaeda and ISIS. In
June 2015, a Frenchman, whom the State alleged had links to ISIS,
decapitated his boss in France's third largest city, Lyon.'2
The style
of the execution was more horrific than its scale, injecting ISIS-style
decapitations-made infamous by the terrorist group's strategic use
of beheading videos and their signature mis en scene of strategic
violence-into the French imagination and France itself.' 2 1
Just five months later, Paris was again struck by terrorism, but this time
on a far broader and more horrific scale. A handful of Muslim terrorists
orchestrated the 11/13 Paris Attacks that killed 129 people, critically
injured 352 others, and, consequently, exposed France's Muslim
population to an unprecedented degree of state scrutiny and backlash.'12
On July 14, 2016, while France was celebrating Bastille Day, its Day
of Independence, tragedy struck the southern city of Nice. The
attack on Nice claimed the lives of 84 people and injured 303 more
when a man drove a truck into a concentrated group of people
partaking in the Day's festivities.2 2 The culprit, Mohamed Lahouaiej
Bouhlel, a 31-year-old Tunisian Frenchman, was a deliveryman with

124. For an overview of the expansion of CVE Policing following the Charlie
Hebdo Attack, see generally Dorrie Hellmuth, CounteringJihadi Terroristsand Radicals
the French Way, 38 STUD. CoNFLIcT & TERRORISM 979 (2015).
125. Angelique Chrisafis, France Beheading: Suspect Had ISIS Links and Terrorist
Motive, Says Prosecutor,GUARDIAN (June 30, 2015, 9:21 AM), http://www.theguardian

.com/world/2015/jun/30/france-beheading-decapitated-boss-terrorist-motive-isislinks-yassin-salhi.
126. For an analysis of how ISIS deploys its beheading videos as recruitment and
propaganda tools, see Nancy Snow, ISIS Beheading Videos: The Scariest Part Is How Well
Their Propaganda Is Working,
GUARDIAN
(Sept.
3,
2014,
11:51 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/sep/03/isis-beheading-videospropaganda-working.
127. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text (describing the attacks). The fact
that at least five of the perpetrators were French nationals bolstered support for CVE
Policing and its focus on homegrown radicals. SeeJay Newton-Small, ParisAttacker Is an
Example of France's Homegrown Terrorists, TIME (Nov. 16, 2015, 9:11 AM),
http://time.com/4113864/paris-attacks-isis-homegrown-terrorism (profiling one of
the primary culprits).
128. Truck Attack in Nice, France: What We Know, and What We Don't, N.Y. TIMES
(July 15, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/16/world/europe/nice-francetruck-attack-what-we-know.html.
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no material link to ISIS or another terror network.' Despite that
lack of a connection, the Nice Attack will undoubtedly usher in
greater demand for CVE Policing in France, particularly in Muslimconcentrated communities throughout the country.
With regard to the scale of the tragedy and the political response that
followed, the Paris Attacksjoined 9/11, 3/11, and 7/7 as lurid and living
examples that the State used to characterize the Muslim threat in
Europe and ISIS's perceived reach into France. This message resonated
with the disgruntled and dissident populations of French Muslims. 3
This reach, however, appeared much greater to French
counterterror policyrnakers than it was in reality. The Paris Attack
stoked the spiking fear of homegrown radicalization, spurring, in
2012, a marked shift toward a reformed counterterror model: CVE
Policing. Although the CVE Policing model was rapidly deployed in
Muslim communities within and beyond Paris, it is at odds with the
concurrent French assimilationist philosophy.
II.

FRENCH COUNTERTERROR POLICY

"The only way to deal with an unfree world is to become so absolutelyfree that
your very existence is an act of rebellion."
-Albert

Camus

Shortly after the 1995 Saint Michel Attack in Paris, the State
believed it could neutralize Muslim terrorism by culturally
assimilating its Muslim population into mainstream French society.'
Whether one identifies as French or Muslim was the existential
ultimatum posed by the State to its Muslim polity. This binary

129. Ben Taub, What We Know About the Attacker in Nice, NEw YORKER (July 15, 2016),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/trying-to-make-sense-of-the-atta
ck-in-nice ("Reports describe him as a troubled, unstable man who had recently been
fired from his job and was undergoing a second divorce. He had three children; for all he
knew, their schoolmates might have been in the crowd. He had a history of domestic
abuse, and a criminal record, with charges ranging from vandalism to assault.").
130. See Christopher Harress, France's War Against ISIS Could Create Homegrown
Terrorists, Experts Say, INT'L Bus. TIMEs (Jan. 16, 2015, 8:35 AM), http://www.ibtimes
.com/frances-war-against-isis-could-create-homegrown-terroists-experts-say-1784086
(cautioning that France's efforts against terrorism following recent attacks could
radicalize even more French Muslims).
131. Wiles, supra note 28, at 703-05 (noting that France's policy of cultural
assimilation began in the nineteenth century and has persisted to include presentday immigrants).
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suggests that combining the two identities is only possible if a French
Muslim adopted one of the State's sanctioned iterations of Islam.
The revved up commitment to "domesticate,""' or "standardize""'
Islam relied on embedded, Orientalist tropes of Islam as being
"backward" and "repressive,"'" fortifying modern misrepresentations
and stoking fears of the homegrown terrorist and radical. This
process required a reformulation of Muslim identity, namely the
State's refereeing of spiritual and physical expressions of Islam in line
with French Republicanism,"' which is built upon militant adherence
to strict secularism, 3 6 or lacit." If French Muslims did not attend a
licensed mosque, follow a state-sanctioned religious leader, or adhere
to schools of thought endorsed by the Ministry of Culture, they were
presumptively subversives, associated with fringe and radical
iterations, and, in turn, radical networks. 31
Two pieces of legislation served as the cornerstones of the cultural
assimilation counterterror model: the Headscarf Ban of 2004 and the

132. "Domestication" is the State's formation of an official French Islam that
aligns with the core principles and political interests of the State. JONATHAN
LAURENCE, THE EMANCIPATION OF EUROPE'S MUSLIMS: THE STATE'S ROLE IN MINORIY
INTEGRATION 249-51 (2012).
133. Fellag, supra note 14, at 12. The French state aims to formally construct a
faction of Islam, which encompasses mosques, institutions, and religious leaders,
viewed as reconcilable with prevailing notions of French identity and in line with
state interests. Id. at 12-14.
134. Id. at 9. See generally FRANTz FANON, A DYING COLONIALISM (Haakon Chevalier
trans., Grove Press 1965) (1959) (analyzing the origins of core, and deeply
embedded, tropes of Islam and Muslims).
135. BOWEN, supra note 65, at 11-12 ("According to the Republican way of
thinking, living together in a society requires agreement on basic values. People in
many countries would agree with this claim, but French Republicans seek to
rigorously and consistently justify policies according to this idea. To do so means
adhering to a certain brand of political philosophy, one that emphasizes general
interests and shared values over individual interests and pluralism.... If the society
has the right mechanisms to integrate people, to make them into citizens, then the
State can be quite generous in welcoming immigrants, extending borders, even
conceiving of a European Empire or a transoceanic one. But these mechanisms
require immigrants to take on the values and the behaviors that signify that one has
become French.").
136. 1958 CONST. art. 1 (Fr.).
137. Laicitiis a complex ideal steeped in French Republicanism and pivotal to the
existential meaning of French identity. See Britton D. Davis, Note, Lifting the Veil:
France'sNew Crusade, 34 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 117, 122 (2011) ("In the modern
era, laicitiarguably defines the 'collective, public identity' of the French people, the
cornerstone of a national personality, defining what it means to 'be French.'").
138. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text (describing the State's
attempts to "standardize" Islam).
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Face Concealment Ban of 2010. The narrowing construction of laicite
following the string of terror attacks outlined in Section I.B served "as
a stumbling block for Muslim entry into full French citizenship." 3 1
In addition to minimizing the "substantive citizenship" of French
Muslims,o however, the Bans had three soft and hard counterterror
objectives.
First, the Bans aimed to prevent the expansion of
expressions of Islam the State deemed to be in conflict with French
notions of modernity and liberalism."' Second, the Bans sought to
punish transgressors that refused to accord their exercise and
expression of Islam in line with the State's secular dictates, or
sanctioned modes of Islamic thought and practice."' 2 Finally, the
Bans served as the cultural anchor of suppressing iterations of Islam
that the State linked with terrorism."'
This Part of the Article juxtaposes the cultural assimilation model
with the State's recent adoption of the CVE Policing paradigm.
Section A examines the former, while Section B provides an overview
of CVE Policing strategy and structures.
A.

Saving Women from Islam: The CulturalAssimilation Model

The 2004 Headscarf and 2010 Face Concealment Bans stand as the
most strident pieces of French cultural assimilationist policy. While
not per se counterterror measures, the State enacted the Bans as
immediate policy responses to terrorist acts committed by Muslims
and the escalating fear of homegrown, masculine Muslim
radicalization.'" Much of the legal scholarship frames the headscarf
debate around concerns about civil and human rights, critical
commentaries linked to liberalism and feminism, or the dialectic

139. DAVIDSON, supra note 27, at 218 (noting that, from the French perspective,
the inability to keep their religious identities private renders them ineligible to be

part of the body politic).
140. LINDA BOsNIAK, THE

CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN:

DHEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY

30-31 (2006) (contending that some marginalized citizenship groups
effectively have a lower citizenship status than others either because the State directly
treats them unequally "or because the legal system treats certain social domains where
de facto inequality prevails (for example, the ostensibly private spheres of economy,
culture, and family) as falling beyond the constrains of citizenship altogether").
141. Fellag, supra note 14, at 9.
MEMBERSHIP

142.

Id. at 10.

143. Henley, supra note 30.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 28-37 (noting that the Face Concealment
Ban was enacted following a string of terrorist attacks).
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However, commentators have
between the State and religion."'
focused far less on the Headscarf Ban as an immediate and long-term
counterterrorism measure. In modem France, cultural assimilation
and counterterrorism are kindred areas of governance and regulation,
with the latter concern dictating the rigidity of the former.'
The Headscarf and Face Concealment Bans are the modem
centerpieces of French assimilationist philosophy. The Bans narrow
the definition of French identity, and aim to establish a form of
assimilation, which seeks to bring about
the obliteration of any "minority identity" in favor of "Frenchness,"
with the objective of achieving a sense of equality through cultural
similarity. As [Olivier] Roy has suggested, there is officially no
"Muslim community" in France at all; Muslims who identify themselves
as members of an ethnic, religious, or cultural minority are best
described in French terms as "causalities of the integration process."1 4 7
Unlike the American or British "multicultural integration"
model,"' the French cultural assimilation model sees French identity as
irreconcilable with public expressions of traditional modes of Muslim
identity, particularly Muslim identities unsanctioned by the State.1 49 By
and large, French counterterrorism strategy is built upon the philosophy
of state control. Namely, the State defines the parameters of religious
expression and exercise, sanctioning which modes of Islamic observance
France's deep reach into the religious
and exercise are permissible.'
lives of its citizens clashes with the American model, as enshrined in the
First Amendment, which prohibits the State from burdening the free
exercise or establishment of religion.'
Furthermore, the French assimilationist model frames its
prohibitions on Islam as a cultural, instead of a religious, concern.

145. These framings are replicated prominently in the social sciences literaturewith the most notable works cited throughout this Article.
146. Wiles, supra note 28, at 729.
147. Id. at 703 (citing Olivier Roy, Islam in France, Religion, Ethnic Community, or
Social Ghetto?, in MusuMs IN EUROPE (B. Lewis & D. Schnapper eds., 2004)).
148. In this model, the rights of ethnic and religious minorities are recognized
and formally protected by law. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof....").
149. DAVIDSON, supra note 27, at 218 ("[I]t is because Muslims cannot relegate
their religious identities to the realm of the private sphere that they cannot be
republican subjects.").
150. See, e.g., infra Sections II.A.1-2 (discussing the Headscarf and Face
Concealment Bans).
151.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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This is a philosophical baseline distinct from both American and
European perspective, which extends into its counterterror
programming: "[France] differs greatly from the British and Dutch
approach in that France sees radicalization as a problem of social
integration rather than a religious issue."112 This framing aligns with
law scholars,1
the analyses of sociologists-such as Fellag 15 -and
who argue that Muslim identity has been systematically converted
into an ethnic or cultural marker, instead of a religious one. Thus,
the State is invested in suppressing cultural expressions of Islam it
associates with radicalization and terrorism and, starting with the
headscarf, has honed in on Islamic practices exclusive to women to
police Islam and France's Muslim communities.
1.

HeadscarfBan of 2004

On March 15, 2004, France implemented Law No. 2004-228,
This legislation
commonly referred to as the "Headscarf Ban."'
"forbade the wearing of 'ostentatious' religious symbols in public
schools.""' While also encompassing Jewish yarmulkes, Sikh turbans,
and conspicuous Christian crosses, the surrounding political context
points to the strong presumption that headscarves, and Muslims at
large, were the primary targets of the Ban.
The findings of the Stasi Commission, the agency convened by
President Chirac to assess the application of secularism in modern
France,"' affirmed this fear. As Professor Cees Maris has written, the

&

152. J. Scott Carpenter et al., Confronting the Ideology of Radical Extremism, 3 J. NAT'L
SEC. L. & POL'Y 301, 313 (2009) (asserting that France has a strong police and
intelligence presence to combat radicalization, whereas the Dutch and British
maintain a community-based approach with the use of established individuals such as
imams, teachers, and social workers).
153. Fellag, supra note 14, at 2.
154. Beydoun, Between Muslim and White, supra note 14, at 43-44 (setting forth that
the "Orientalist discourses did not draw a distinction between the Arab and the
Muslim"). See generally Volpp, supra note 22, at 1592-98 (investigating the shifting
relationship between citizenship and identity experienced by the "Middle Eastern,
Arab, or Muslim" people post-9/11).
155. Khaled A. Beydoun, Laicit6, Liberalism, and the Headscarf 10 J. IslAMIc L.
188, 189 (2008) [hereinafter Beydoun, Laicit6, Liberalism, and the Headscarf].
The law is codified at CODE DE L'TDUCATION [EDUCATION CODE] art. 141-5-1.
156. Id. (quoting Adrien Katherine Wing & Monica Nigh Smith, Critical Race
Feminism Lifts the Veil?: Muslim Women, France, and the HeadscarfBan, 39 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 743, 745 (2006)).
157. Wiles, supra note 28, at 702-03 ("In July 2003, President Jacques Chirac set up
the Stasi Commission to produce a report on the application of the laicit6
principle....").
CULTURE
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influential Stasi Report rendered a damning assessment of the
headscarf and its role in maintaining a form of Muslim expression
that infringed upon narrowing bounds of French identity:
Islamic scarves express a tendency toward religious isolation.
Moreover, as symbols of the traditional subordination of women in
the Islamic world, they impede the development of girls into
autonomous persons. The command to wear headscarves in public
ensues from the traditional Muslim ideal of female chastity that
puts women under lifelong control of men.... [A] large group is
wearing headscarves under a threat of force and violence ....
According to the Commission, this corresponds with other Islamic
violations of women's rights, such as arranged marriages, polygamy,
repudiation, and clitoridectomy [female genital mutilation].
The Report's indictment of the headscarf as a tool of
subordination and violence toward women were tied to concomitant
tropes of Muslim men as misogynistic and oppressive. These very
tropes shape modem formulations of terror and radical threat.
Therefore, positioning the gendered dialectic of the masculine Muslim
oppressor against the bounded, subordinate Muslim woman; the latter
of which the State aimed to liberate, and the former standing as the
primary target of its mounting counterterrorism might.
Within the political sphere, the "scarf as oppression" findings
rendered by the Stasi Commission resonated strongly with French
Parliament'" and appealed to the "gendered Islamophobia" pervasive
in all spheres of modern French society.'" By a gaping 494-to-36
margin, French parliamentarians passed the Headscarf Ban.' 6

158.

Cees Maris, Laicit6 in the Low Countries? On Headiscaroesin a Neutral State 1, 6

(Jean Monnet Working Paper 14/07, 2007).
159. Wing & Smith, supra note 156, at 767. For an analysis of how the headscarf
stigmatized Muslim American women post-9/11, see generally Sahar F. Aziz, From the
Oppressed to the Terrorist: Muslim American Women in the Crosshairs of Intersectionality, 9

191 (2012).
160. See BOWEN, supra note 65, at 156 ("[S]exism and violence against women
appear in recent arguments and writings as one of the principal dangers posed by
Islamism. Physical abuse of women and misogynist attitudes in the poor suburbs are
among the most alarming sign of the degradation of social life. These acts threaten
the gains made by women in their fight for respect-and the precariousness of these
gains makes the treat to them all the more worrisome. Feminists mobilized public
opinion against the voile [headscarfJ by linking communalism and Islamism to the
oppression of women in France and throughout the World.").
161. Henley, supra note 30. About a month later, the Senate passed the ban 276
HASTINGS RACE &POVERTYL.J.

to twenty.

Associated Press, French Senate Adopts Ban on Islamic Headscarves, USA

(Mar. 3, 2004, 4:25 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/200403-03-france-headscarvesx.htm.
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The scope of enforcement manifested the preventative and
punitive objectives of the Headscarf Ban. The Ban restricts the
headscarf in public elementary schools, junior high schools and high
schools.'
In addition, "[S]tudents are prohibited from wearing
signs or clothing through which they exhibit conspicuously a
religious affiliation."'
In line with the conclusions drawn by the
Stasi Commission, the Headscarf Ban functioned as a policing
measure on young French Muslim women, by criminalizing a core
expression of Islamic piety within schools-the very places where
students are intellectually and culturally shaped into citizens. 1
The passage of the bill sparked vehement criticism from within and
beyond the French Muslim community."' The bill, however, marked a
significant win for proponents of the hardline cultural assimilation
approach to further domesticate Islam" and advanced a counterterror
program built upon stifling religious identities and expressions
associated with terrorism and radicalization. Following the 7/7 Attack in
London, the Van Gogh Affair in the Netherlands, the global expansion
of Al Qaeda and the rabid fear it spurred, Sarkozy's National Front party
tightened the State's cultural grip on Islam and punishment of
Muslims, which in turn broadened its counterterror objectives.6
2.

Face Concealment Ban of 2010
The National Front party leveraged the string of terror attacks after
the Headscarf Ban to further erode the public presence of Islam in
France. Six years later, the Face Concealment Ban-commonly referred

162.

Nicole Atwill, France - Implementation of Law ProhibitingReligious Clothing in

Public Schools, 12 WORLD L. BuLL. 15,15-16 (2004), http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov
/wlb/200412.pdf.
163. Id.
164. While the Headscarf Ban stands as the centerpiece policy promoting cultural
assimilation within schools, the Ministry of Education in France adopted an additional
eleven measures following the Charlie Hebdo Attack aimed at promoting secular values
in French schools. France: Extremism & Counter-Extremism, supra note 86, at 1.
165. Henley, supra note 30 (quoting Greville Janner, vice president of the World
Jewish Congress, as saying that French legislators had "disgracefully punished the
entire Muslim population and other religious communities").
166. LAURENCE, supra note 132, at 249-51.
167. See Lisa Bryant, France Cracks Down on RadicalIslam, Arresting 19, VOICE OF AM.
(Mar. 29, 2012, 8:00 PM), http://www.voanews.com/content/france-will-continuearresting-suspected-islamic-militants-sarkozy-vows-145114165/180176.html (noting
that the government had banned six Islamic preachers from entering France to
participate in a Muslim conference).
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to the "Burqa" or "Niqab" Ban-extended the punitive arm of the State
into the religious lives of Muslim women." On July 13, 2010,
[T]he French Parliament passed a law that banned all facial
coverngs worn in public spaces. While the Law 2010-1192 of
October 11, 2010 Banning Concealment of the Face in Public ...
does not mention any specific type of clothing, many understood
the primary target of the law to be the burqaor niqab, veils that are
worn by ... Muslim women in France.6
The Ban went into effect on April 11, 2011, and broadened
policing of Islamic expressions from the "schools to the streets."1o
In line with the association of conservative Islamic women's dress
with the "oppression and violence" rationale outlined in the Stasi
Report,"' the Face Concealment Ban passed the French Senate by a
glaring 246-to-1 margin, with "about 100 abstentions coming
The Headscarf Ban
essentially from left-leaning politicians." 2
embedded the cultural assimilation counterterror model even
deeper, during an impasse when fears of transnational terrorist
networks-most notably Al Qaeda-were climaxing."'
Far more comprehensive in scope, the law prohibits full-face veils
in almost all public areas, including streets, businesses, and
government buildings, but not places of worship."' From a national
security standpoint, the State framed modes of Muslim face
concealment as more threatening than headscarves because of its

168. Heider, supra note 79, at 93 ("The primary counter-view in the burqa debate
is that a public burqa ban violates human rights by eliminating the rights to
individual liberty and freedom of religion. In addition, some burqa supporters view
a ban itself as a form of discrimination, as such bans tend to be tailored specifically to
Muslims and reflective of anti-Islamic sentiments." (footnotes omitted)).
169. Jennifer Fredette, Becoming a Threat: The Burqa and Contestation over Public
Morality Law in France, 40 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 585, 585 (2015) (footnote omitted).
170. Ware, supra note 82, at 233; France's Burqa Ban in Effect Next Month, CNN

(Mar. 4, 2011, 7:27 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/europe/03/04/franc
e.burqa.ban/.
171. Ware, supra note 82, at 232-33.
172.

French Senate Approves Burqa Ban, CNN

(Sept.

15,

2010,

5:17 AM),

http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/09/14/france.burqa.ban/.
173. See Al-Qaeda Around the World, BBC NEWS (Aug. 5, 2013, 9:21 PM),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-13296443 (discussing attacks and attempted
attacks around the world leading up to and following the approval of the Headscarf
Ban in 2010).
174. Heider, supra note 79, at 96-97 ("Any woman caught wearing a face-covering
veil is subject to a 150 euro fine or a mandatory French citizenship course.
Additionally, anyone who forces a woman to wear a religious garment is punishable
by a 30,000 euro fine and a year in prison; 60,000 euro and two years in prison if the
forced individual is a minor." (footnotes omitted)).
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perceived link with conservative or militant iterations of Islam, such
as Wahhabism or Salafism.'7 5
A National Assembly working group that convened in 2010 echoed
the Stasi Commission's rationale that traditional Islamic dress is
To further suppress conservative Islamic values
oppressive.
deemed to be at odds with French identity and emblematic of
terrorism, the Ban focused on the perception of the Muslim man
forcing a woman to wear the face concealment.17 1 In other words, the
Ban's express targets, again, were French Muslim women, but
constructively directed at men perpetuating the "subordination of
women ... under a threat of force and violence."17
This Orientalist, gendered dialectic also served as the basis for
pushing forward the Face Concealment Ban. Culturally, policing the
dress of Muslim women provided a legal means to police the
perceived terrorist proclivities of French Muslim men. In turn, the
Face Concealment Ban broadened the "cultural control as
counterterrorism" philosophy of the State, which stood as the
primary model from 2004 until 2012, when fears of homegrown
radicalization inspired by a new geopolitical threat, ISIS, spurred the
beginning of a shift in state counterterror philosophy and policy.
B.

Toward a CVE-Centered CounterterrorModel

"

"It wasn't until the Merah affair (2012) that French counterterrorismstrategy
began to change.

-Francesco

Ragazzi'"

175. Conservative schools of Islamic Sunni examine scripture from a textual
approach and believe that Islam today should be practiced in the same fashion it was
during the Prophet Mohammad's time. See generally DAVID COMMINS, TiHE WAHHABI
MISsION AND SAUDI AIABIA vi-viii (2006) (explaining Wahhabi and Salafi thought and
their contemporary political impact); SAGEMAN, supra note 85, at 1 (providing an
analysis of how Wahhabi and Salafi thought drive modern terrorist networks, most
notably Al Qaeda).
176. Davis, supra note 137, at 118 ("Following a five month study, a parliamentary
commission created by the French National Assembly-which included thirty-two
members of Parliament from various political parties-issued a report stating that,
'[t]he wearing of the full veil is a challenge to our [R]epublic....
We must
condemn this excess.'").

177.

Id. at 118, 127-28.

178.
179.

Beydoun, Laicite, Liberalism, and the Headscarf supra note 155, at 204-05.
Ragazzi, supra note 115, at 10.
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Rising fear of homegrown radicalization led to the State's
implementation of CVE Policing programs in 2012.'
Before the
2012 Merah Affair, France's primary domestic intelligence agenciesthe Direction Centrale des Renseignements Gindraux (DCRG) and the
Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST)-rebuffed CVE Policing
on four grounds: first, it was philosophically at odds with their
cultural assimilation counterterror strategy; second, it curbed the
State's per se commitment to secularism; third, it strategically
conflicted with the hardline law enforcement policies within French
Muslim communities, particularly the banlieues, and, perhaps most
notably, fourth, law enforcement refused to collaborate with
elements within the French Muslim community to prevent
radicalization."' This is particularly true for religious leaders and
institutions sanctioned by the State, which the vast majority of French
Muslims do not look to for religious direction and worship.
Furthermore, most of France's Muslim population perceives these
leaders to be both religious and political.18 2
Emerging fears of homegrown radicalization, however, have
altered the State's rigid stance against collaborating with French
At this juncture, the
Muslim community and religious leaders.
counterterror interests of the State called for softening the hardline
assimilationist tactics essential for an effective CVE Policing regime.
Manifesting this shifting interest convergence, CVE Policing became
a "political priority" after the Merah Affair 83 and, coupled with the
Nemmouche Affair in 2014, led to the State's gradual expansion of
formal CVE Policing initiatives.18 4

180. The growing emergence of CVE Policing and related programs resulted from
both international and external pressures.
"[T]he American government, since the French riots of 2005, has been
worried about how the alienation of European Muslims may weaken
European allies. American diplomats and scholars are intervening in
numerous ways, urging European states to adopt American-style race and
security policies, funding Muslim organizations, [and] commissioning
studies on 'moderate' Islam."
HIsHAM D. AIDI, REBEL Music: RACE, EMIRE, AND THE NEW MUSLIM YOUTH CULTURE

196 (2014).
181. Ragazzi, supra note 115, at 10 ("For French counterterrorism officials, setting up
formal partnerships with imams and community religious institutions is out of the
question, just as it is difficult to imagine local police-mosque or police-Muslim association
collaborations, or even passing legislation to separate 'good Islam' from 'bad."').
182. Roy, Islamic TerronistRadicalisation,supra note 19, at 59.
183. Ragazzi, supra note 115, at 3.

184.

Id.
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These new measures signaled a strategic shift in France's
counterterror program, but fell short of the structural reforms needed
to carry the shift forward. President Hollande issued "a number of
statements concerning the need to reform France's counterterrorism
strategy, in particular by following the examples of countries" with
Changing political realities
established CVE Policing programs.1 8 5
persuaded Hollande to move away from a rigid counterterror
approach, prompting closer collaboration with other nations through
the Police Planner's Network on Countering Radicalisation and
Polarisation (PPN)." The PPN was created to pool information and
share best practices between member states."' Working closely with
other nations similarly committed to CVE Policing tactics-particularly
the United Kingdom-has highlighted how French cultural
assimilationist counterterror strategies stood between it and the
effective implementation of core CVE Policing strategy."
Yet, the State's new commitment to CVE Policing did not trigger
any major reforms to the cultural assimilationist counterterror
programs enforced by the State. Currently, the two models are
contemporaneously deployed by the State, but-as examined in Part
III-are philosophically and fundamentally at odds. This conflict
requires state retrenchment and softening of its cultural assimilation
campaign as a vital step toward mobilizing CVE Policing.
Before analyzing how the French cultural assimilation model
undermines CVE Policing, a survey of the latter's structure and
strategy, following the State's considerable expansion of the
counterterror model after the 2012 Merah Affair through the
November 2015 Paris Attacks, is in order.
1.

CVE Policingstructures and strate
The meaning and scope of the counter-radicalization strategy
driving CVE Policing is still ambiguous and underdeveloped.
Professor Samuel Rascoff articulates this ambiguity:

185. Id. at 3, 6-8 (examining the CVE Policing programs in the United Kingdom
and the Netherlands).
186.

The Policy Planners Network on Countering Radicalism and Polarization (PPN),

https://www.counterextremism.org/about-us/ppn
(last visited Aug. 17, 2016) (stating that the French Ministry of Interior cooperates
with ten other counterparts from Europe and North America on how best to counter
extremism, polarization, and radicalism).
187. Id.
188. Ragazzi, supra note 115, at 10-11.
INST. FOR STRATEGIc DIALOGUE,
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To its proponents, counter-radicalization begins with the
uncontroversial proposition that manifestations of violent
extremism are rooted in ideas and social-behavioral processes.
Understanding and addressing those ideas and processes will help
prevent future attacks and thus should play an important role in
American counterterrorism policy. But these basic assumptions
give rise to a wide range of theoretical possibilities about what
counter-radicalization is, how it should be conducted, and how the
government can best devote its resources to address the
contemporary security threat." 9
This ambiguity, and the "theoretical possibilities" that emanate
from it,' 90 extends broad latitude to states, enabling them to enforce
CVE Policing programs however they see fit. But from the vantage
point of Muslim populations, this ambiguity is the source of state
encroachment into their private lives. Loosely defined standards
facilitate the broad dragnets that frame Islam as the source of
radicalization and Muslims as presumptive threats, which ushers in
collateral victimization and marked diminishment of civil liberties.
CVE, per its name, is committed to identifying and preventing
"violent extremists" from committing terrorist acts."' As Professor
Sahar Aziz observes, "[olperationally, the objective is to stop people
from embracing extreme beliefs (an inherently subjective and vague
term) that might lead to terrorism, as well as to reduce active support for
terrorist groups.""
Anchored in this philosophy of prevention,
proponents of CVE Policing argue that law enforcement-and their
informants-are able to prevent targets, principally young, "westernized"
Muslim men,' from adopting an extremist ideology.' 94 To carry
forward the broader aim of preventing radicalization, both "soft" and
"hard" strategies are exercised by states that adopt the CVE regime."

189. Rascoff, supra note 26, at 137.
190. Id.
("[T]he radicalization process so described need not-and
191. Id. at 141
frequently does not--culminate in mobilization to engage in terrorist violence. The
radicalized subject is not a terrorist, but rather someone who may be predisposed to
regard terrorist violence as religiously sanctioned." (footnotes omitted)); Countering
Violent Extremism, DEP'T HOMELAND SEcuarrY, https://www.dhs.gov/counteringviolent-extremism (last updated July 6, 2016).
192. Sahar F. Aziz, Policing Terrorists in the Community, 5 HARv. NAT'L SECURrrYJ.
147, 164 (2014).
193.

See Roy, Islamic Terrorist Radicalisation, supra note 19, at 52 (discussing the

European background of many Muslim men with ties to terror groups).
194. Rascoff, supra note 26, at 142.
195. See Ragazzi, supra note 115, at 4 (explaining that "hard" CVE Policing tactics
fall within the realms of criminal and national security policing, such as arrests,
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propensity
for
links
radicalization-or
CVE
philosophy
radicalization-with "certain religious and political cultures within
The CVE philosophy breaks down the
Muslim communities."'
"identifiable and predictable process by which a Muslim becomes a
terrorist" 7 into four stages:
(1)
"preradicalization,"
(2)
"identification," (3) "indoctrination," and (4) "action. "198
In line with this process, a subject is viewed as a greater threat at
each successive stage. Thus, CVE preventive logic seeks to seize the
subject at the early stages before full-fledged indoctrination takes
place and, most critically, before terrorist action is planned and
pursued.' 99 During the first stage, and variably the second, suspicion
is largely linked to certain kinds of religious expression or political
activity that law enforcement suspects is linked with radical activity. 00
As illustrated during the aftermath of the San Bernardino Shooting
in the United States in December 2015, the FBI desperately sought to
link the shooters, Tashfeen Malik and Syed Rizwan Farook, to ISIS,
drawing a tenuous link to the terror group on grounds that Malik
pledged her allegiance to the group in a Facebook post, yet absent
any material involvement or direct communication with ISIS
agents.

201

expulsion and removal, police interviews, and asset freezing, while "soft" CVE tactics
focus on building personal relationships and programmatic ties with law
enforcement).
196. Akbar, Policing "Radicalization",supra note 13, at 814.
197. Id. at 820 (citing FBI COUNTERTERRORISM Div., THE RADICALIZATION PROCESS:
FROM CONVERSION TOJIHAD 2 (2006)).
198. Id. (citing FBI CouNTERRoRIsM Div., supra note 197, at 3). Preradicalization
involves people living in communities susceptible to radicalization; identification
involves a gravitation towards Salafi Islam; indoctrination occurs when an individual
intensifies his ideology; and action occurs when there is an intent to commit a
terrorist act. Id. at 834-36.

199.

Id. at 820.

200.

FBI COUNTERTERRORISM Div., supra note 197, at 4.

201. Michael S. Schmidt & Richard P6rez-Pefia, FBI. Treating San Bernardino
Attack as Terrorism Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12
/05/us/tashfeen-malik-islamic-state.html; see Laura Wagner, Still No Evidence Linking
San Bernardino Shooters to ISIS, FBI Says, NPR: Two-WAY (Dec. 16, 2015, 6:04 PM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/12/16/460021165/still-no-evidencelinking-san-bernardino-shooters-to-isis-fbi-says (reporting that two weeks after the San
Bernardino Shooting, the FBI had still not linked the perpetrators to ISIS); see also
Khaled A. Beydoun, The Ethnicity of San BernardinoShooters Doesn't Matter, AL JAZEERA
(Dec. 4, 2015), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/12/ethnicity-sanbernardino-shooters-doesn-matter-california-shooting-151203063729874.html
(critiquing how the ethnic or racial identity of the shooters raised the immediate
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Prominent French intellectual Olivier Roy departs from the
prevailing American and British configuration of radicalization. Roy,
a prolific commentator on radicalization and counter-radicalization,
defines the process more narrowly, rendering two definitions that
explicitly focus on Muslim extremism:
First those who jumped into action either 1) having reached a
terrorist sanctuary, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, or previously Bosnia,
Afghanistan, 2) having perpetrated a terrorist attack or 3) been
caught in an advanced stage of preparation for such an attack. The
second category is made by those who manifested only an intention
to go to some Jihad place or to do something in Europe. The
problem is that the second category has swollen because of the
increasing surveillance of the Internet social networks by the
security services; it remains difficult to grasp how many would have
effectively gone for action if they had not been spotted.2 0 2
Roy's definitions, not formally adopted by the State, are narrower
than the facially neutral American (and British) interpretation of
20
radicalization"
that are overwhelmingly concerned with policing
Muslim subjects and communities.2 o4
Roy, however, is critical of the core CVE baseline that radicalization
is linked to communal trajectories or wholesale religious groups,
arguing that "radicalisation seems more linked to individual
trajectories." 0" Therefore, Roy suggests that CVE strategy should
focus more on individual subjects, and the societal symptoms that
give rise to it, instead of religious doctrine alone or religious groups
Roy concludes that, "we should make a distinction
at large. 0

presumption of terrorism, illustrating a double standard with white culprits of mass
shootings).
Roy, DrivingForce, supra note 93, at 3.
See Countering Violent Extremism, supra note 191 (explaining that radicalism
and violent extremist threats can "come from a range of groups and individuals").
204. In practice, CVE Policing programs in the United States are primarily geared
toward and deployed against Muslim populations. See Akbar, Policing "Radicalization",
supra note 13, at 811 (explaining that American CVE Policing, especially from the
FBI and NYPD, focuses on Muslims even though data shows that violence from whitesupremacist and right-wing groups is more likely).
205. Roy, DrivingForce, supra note 93, at 4.
206. Roy outlines the primary baselines of radicalization in France and contends
that: (1) "There are no psychiatric specific patterns for radicals"; (2) "The majority
of the radicals come from second generation Muslims born in Europe, the others are
converts"; (3) "Many have a past of petty delinquency and drug dealing"; (4) "It is
clearly a youth movement"; (5) "Very few of them had a previous story of militancy,
either political ... or religious"; (6) "The unusual proportion of converts has been
systematically overlooked because it contradicts the (culturalist) idea that individual
202.

203.
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*

between religious radicalisation and jihadist radicalisation, "207 the
latter of which leaders within the French Muslim community are also
committed to stifling. 20 8 Echoing Roy, some research strongly
suggests that it is not Islam that radicalizes disaffected youths, but it is
disaffected youths-recruited and inspired by terrorist networks like
ISIS-that radicalize Islam.2
To further counterterrorism objectives, the Macro-CVE Policing
methods of radicalization, adopted by counterterror brass in the
United States and the United Kingdom, and the Micro-CVE Policing
alternative, proffered by Roy, require the assistance and involvement
of Muslim interlocutors-a strategic and structural cornerstone of the
Muslim interlocutors must support state
CVE Policing model.
counterterror policy from the bottom-up, rather than the State's
current policy of enforcing a top-down approach, which views French
Muslims as cultural transgressors instead of full-fledged citizens.
Building strategic alliances with advocacy, cultural, and religious
organizations is of paramount importance to counterterror and law
"Local
enforcement agencies employing CVE programs.210
community engagement is vital in this battle for the minds of young
people" who are vulnerable to radical outfits and ideologies."
Residents and leaders within French Muslim communities equip law
enforcement with on-the-ground informants, interlocutors, and
radicalisation reflects a radicalisation of a frustrated Muslim community." Id. at 5-9;
see also Fellag, supra note 14, at 2 (echoing Roy's "culturalist critique," and
identifying, "the historical tendency of the French state to label French North
Africans as 'Muslims'").
207. Roy, DrivingForce, supra note 93, at 11-12 (arguing also that "radicals have a
loose or no connection with the Muslim communities in Europe," which reveals that
the radicalization process is not taking place within the confines of customary places
of Muslim worship and community). Otherwise stated, radicals often use religion as
a means or mask for furthering non-religious ends.
208. Section I1I.B.1, infra, continues this discussion, and proposes an adoption of
Micro-CVE Policing strategies focused on politicking the "individual trajectories" Roy
identifies.
209. See Roy, France's Oedipal Islamist Complex, supra note 1 (noting that "already
disaffected [youths] are seeking a cause, a label, a grand narrative to which they can
add the bloody signature of their personal revolt," of which a mutated iteration of
Islam provides convenient means).
210. See Countering Violent Extremism, supra note 191 (explaining that the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security maintains partnerships to support efforts by faith
leaders, local government officials, and communities to prevent radicalization).
211. Margarita Bizina & David H. Gray, Radicalization of Youth as a Growing Concern
for Counter-Terrorism Policy, 5 GLOBAL SEcuRrY STUD. 72, 77 (2014) (explaining that
engagement helps youths develop ties to the community instead of forming a
separate community of their own).
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watchdogs.
Furthermore, native informants and respected
community figures would build legitimacy to the State's
counterterror intervention strategy.
In addition, informants also add legitimacy to CVE Policing by
either express or tactic endorsement. If a respected figure, such as
an Imam," takes on responsibility as interlocutor or informant, he
not only sources law enforcement with invaluable and otherwise
inaccessible information about a prospective target, but also stamps
the policy with a seal of approval from an esteemed community
figure. In addition, members of specific French Muslim communities
possess a familiarity with the faith, and familiarity with residents that
the State and law enforcement lack.
This double-familiarity is especially vital for shaping Micro-CVE
Policing Programs, the focus of Section III.B.2, which shifts the
geography of the law enforcement and informant monitoring from
spaces of religious observance to spaces of social deviance.2 1 3 This can
be accomplished by first diminishing the presumption of guilt
rendered onto Muslims as well as the subsequent state scrutiny and
backlash distributed to them at large. A further step for an effective
CVE Policing policy is to create a model that strategically hones in on
the specific roots that give rise to radicalization, effectively preempting
the youth's exposure to terror networks, most notably ISIS.
2.

Bolstering the French CVE Policingmodel
A trustworthy metric showing how well ISIS's message is being
received in France is the French contribution to ISIS's foreign
A
fighters, which is greater than any other Western country.
prominent 2015 study estimates that approximately 1,200 of the 4,000
Europeans that traveled to Syria and Iraq to fight with ISIS were
French citizens214-mOre recent estimates are as high as 2,000 French

212. Imams are the spiritual leader of a mosque or Muslim place of worship.
213. Roy, French Muslims Working, supra note 38 ("Radicalized young people ...
come from the periphery of the Muslim word. They are moved to action by the
displays of the violence in the media of Western culture. They embody a
generational rupture (parents now call the police when their children leave for
Syria), and they are not involved with the local religious community and the
neighborhood mosques.").
214. Peter R. Neumann, Foreign Fighter Total in Syria/Iraq Now Exceeds 20,000;
SurpassesAfghanistan Conflict in the 1 980s, INT'L CTR. FOR STUDY RADICALISATION & POL.
VIOLENCE (Jan. 26, 2015), http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-no

w-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/; see KRISTIN ARcHICK ET AL.,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44003, EUROPEAN FIGHTERS IN SYRIA AND IRAQ: ASSESSMENTS,
RESPONSES, AND ISSUES FOR THE UNITED STATES 9 (2015), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs
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Either number is at least double the estimate of the next
fighters.
two biggest feeder states, Germany and the United Kingdom.2 " The
magnitude of these figures indicates that ISIS's message may be more
ISIS
resonant in France than in any other European nation.
dedicates considerable resources targeting French recruits,
publishing a French language magazine, Dar al Islam, and, in
November 2014, releasing a "recruit[ment] video aimed at French
Muslims, calling on jihadists to execute attacks in France if they could
not make it to ISIS-held territory."

17

The high numbers

of

Frenchmen traveling to ISIS-controlled territory illustrates that ISIS's
enhanced recruitment efforts in France have proven fruitful.
On the heels of the Merah and Nemmouche Affairs, the Charlie
Hebdo Attack, and, most recently, the 11/13 Paris Attacks, the State
began to form and fortify its CVE Policing program. The adopted
initiatives were aimed at cutting off ties between ISIS and the French
Muslim population and to prevent radicalization before it fully
matures into a terrorist attack.218 As analyzed in Section III.A,
however, these reforms are currently impeded by the hardline
cultural assimilationist approach marginalizing French Muslim
communities as second-class citizens, making counterterror pariahs
out of potential partners.
First, the State responded by "[i]mposing travel bans on individuals
suspected of seeking terrorist training abroad, arresting individuals for
speech deemed supportive of terrorism, and blocking websites that
encourage terrorism."" In line with the preventative aim of CVE
Policing, the measure monitors, confines, and prosecutes the speech,
association, and engagement with literature of designated terror

/row/R44003.pdf (explaining that many Europeans who have gone to fight with ISIS
may have been radicalized to some extent before they left and were dissatisfied with
Western society).
215. Kim Willsher, France to Set Up a Dozen DeradicalisationCentres, GUARDIAN (May
9, 2016, 9:13 AM), www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/09/france-to-set-up-a-do
zen-deradicalisation-centres.
216. Neumann, supra note 214, at 1-2.
217. France: Extremism & Counter-Extremism, supranote 86, at 3.
218. Akbar, Policing "Radicalization", supra note 13, at 820; see, e.g., Henry Samuel,
France to Open "De-RadicalisationCentres" in Every Region to Tackle Islamist Threat,
TELEGRAPH

(May 9, 2016, 6:21 PM), www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/09/france-

to-open-de-radicalisation-centres-in-every-region-to-tack (announcing the opening of
centers that would house those deemed at risk of radicalization).
219. Paul Belkin, France: Efforts to Counter Islamist Terrorism and the Islamic State,
CRS INSIGHT (Nov. 18, 2015), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/IN1 0301.pdf.
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networks, like ISIS.22" If enforced broadly, this measure stands to
infringe upon a broad range of innocuous religious activity, associations,
and protected political speech engaged in by French Muslims."
Second, as part of "exceptional measures" to respond to the rising
radical threat, the French Circle of Ministers earmarked nearly 736
million Euros and commissioned an additional 2,500 law enforcement
personnel, to bolster policing of French Muslim communities." This
expansion of police presence within French Muslim communities was
strongest within the indigent banlieues, the most tightly policed space
within France.2 These actions have laid key law enforcement building
blocks
for
Macro-CVE
Policing
strategies,
which
focus
disproportionately on concentrated Muslim communities saturated
with mosques, cultural and community centers, schools, halal
butcheries, and other sites serving the local population.
Third, in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo Attack, Parliament passed
what is commonly referred to as the "French Patriot Act."2 2 ' This
surveillance measure, "[a]llows intelligence agencies to tap phones
In addition
and emails without seeking permission from a judge."2
to warrantless searches, the "French Patriot Act" enables law
enforcement to carry forward protracted monitoring of Muslim

220. Id.
221. The Constitution of France enshrines broad free speech rights. Article 11 of
the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789, which is
incorporated into the Constitution's preamble, states: "The free communication of
ideas and opinions is one of the most precious of the rights of man. Every citizen
may, accordingly, speak, write, and print with freedom, but shall be responsible for
such abuses of this freedom as shall be defined by law." 1789 DECLARATION OF THE
RIGHTS OF MAN art. 11 (Fr.) translated in YALE L. SCH.: AVALON PROJECT (2008),
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th-century/rightsof.asp.

222. Exceptional Measures to Combat the Terrorist Threat,

FR. UNITED STATES

(Jan. 21,

2015), http://www.franceintheus.org/spip.php?article6445.
223. See Chrisafis, Nothing's Changed, supra note 5 (noting that, in the absence of
neighborhood police officers in these areas, police work is often done by elite units
without any connection or trust with the young people there).
224. Lawmakers Back Spy Bill Dubbed the "FrenchPatriotAct", FR. 24 (May 5, 2015),
http://www.france24.com/en/20150505-lawmakers-back-spy-bill-dubbed-frenchpatriot-act (explaining that the law passed the National Assembly, the lower
chamber, by a 438-to-86 margin after receiving support from the two main political
parties); Sam Schechner, French Senate Passes Intelligence Bill, WALL ST.J. (June 9, 2015,
1:48 PM), www.wsj.com/articles/french-senate-passes-intelligence-bill-1433872098
(reporting that the surveillance law passed the Senate, the upper house, on a 252-to67 margin).
225. Angelique Chrisafis, FrancePasses New Surveillance Law in Wake of CharlieHebdo
Attack, GUARDIAN (May 5, 2015, 12:11 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/20
15/may/05/france-passes-new-surveillance-law-in-wake-of-charlie-hebdo-attack.
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targets and institutions and make house arrests based merely on the
suspicion of associating with a terror network." Unsurprisingly, the
measure has been disproportionately enforced on France's Muslim
linking Muslim identity to presumed suspicion of
population,2
radicalization. Amnesty International France condemned the French
Patriot Act as a "major blow" to French human rights, and
specifically, the rights of its 4.7 million Muslim citizens. 2
Extending its efforts to counter Muslim radicalization at the terrornetwork level, President Hollande vowed to redouble France's
military campaign against ISIS.22'

These efforts were dedicated to

nations that are geographic strongholds for terrorist networks where
In
French Muslims have strong ancestral and familial ties. 2 o
function, this initiative is as much domestic policy as it is foreign
policy-oriented. Namely, it seeks to weaken transnational terrorist
networks on their indigenous turf, stifle their global reach, and
eliminate their reach into French Muslim communities.
Collectively, these measures, issued between 2012 and 2015,
illustrate the State's increasing commitment and rapid integration of
CVE Policing. After the Paris Attacks, additional measures further
bolstering CVE soft and hard measures are sure to follow. The rapid
expansion of CVE built on a philosophy of community collaboration
and exchange, is on a collision course with the established cultural
assimilationist model. While CVE Policing philosophy is itself not
monolithic, as manifested through Macro and Micro-CVE Policing

226. Loi 55-385 du 3 avril 1955 relative A l'6tat d'urgence [Law No. 55-385 of April
3, 1955 Regarding the State of Emergency], http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTex
te.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000695350.
227. See AlissaJ. Rubin, Muslims in France Say Emergency Powers Go Too Far, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/18/world/europe/france
s-emergency-powers-spur-charges-of-overreach-from-muslims.html (noting that hundreds
of French Muslims had been placed under house arrest under the new powers).
228. La Loi sur le Renseignement Doit itre D&larieInconstitutionnelle[Law on Intelligence
Should Be Declared Unconstitutional], AMNESTY INT'L FR. (July 10, 2015),
http://www.amnesty.fr/Nos-campagnes/Liberte-expression/Actualites/La-loi-sur-lesee Elizabeth Bryant,
renseignement-doit-etre-declaree-inconstitutionnelle-15641;
Amid the Mourning, French Unity Shows Cracks, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Nov. 27, 2015),
http://www.dw.com/en/amid-the-mourning-french-unity-shows-cracks/a-18880719
(noting that Amnesty International France's main concern was that the state of
emergency laws might become permanent).
229. Belkin, supra note 219.
230. David A. Graham, What Is France Doing in Syria?, ATLANTIc (Nov. 15, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/11/france-syria-iraqisis/416013/.
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approaches, Part III examines the ruptures and conflicts between
CVE Policing and the assimilationist counterterror approach.
III. BEYOND PARIS: A NEW COUNTERTERROR POLICY UNVEILED

"[ISIS's aim] is to [motivate] crowds drawn from the masses to fly to the
regions which we manage, particularly the youth."

-The

Management of Savagery (ISIS Manifesto)"'

"These rebels without a causefind injihad a 'noble' and global cause, and are
consequently instrumentalisedby a radical organization(Al Qaeda, ISIS),
that has a strategic agenda."
-Olivier

Roy"2

On November 15, 2015, two days after the Paris Attacks, President
Hollande ordered fighter jets to bomb strategic sites in eastern
Syria.23" The attacks were the first of what Hollande promised to be a
"pitiless" war against ISIS;2' a war France is poised to fight in lands
"managed" by ISIS,23 5 and in line with the homegrown origins of the
Paris Attack culprits. Within a week of the Paris Attacks, French
Parliament announced a three-month state of emergency236 and

231. ABU BAIGL NAJI, THE MANAGEMENT OF SAvAGERY: THE MOST CRITICAL STAGE
THROUGH WHICH THE UmMA WILL PAss 51 (William McCants trans., John M. Olin Inst.
for Strategic Studies at Harvard Univ. 2006) (2004), https://azelin.files.wordpress.co
m/2010/08/abu-bakr-naji-the-management-of-savagery-the-most-critical-stage-throug
The 268-page manifesto was drafted for the Iraqi
h-which-the-umma-will-pass.pdf.
branch of Al Qaeda, an ISIS precursor. ISIS, however, adopts the manifesto as its own.
232. Roy, Driving Force, supra note 93, at 5 (reproducing a speech by Roy in
Germany five days after the Paris Attacks).
233. Emily Shapiro, FrenchJetsBomb ISIS Targets in Syria After Police Launch Manhunt
for "Dangerous"Suspect,ABC NEWS (Nov. 15, 2015, 9:34 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/
International/french-jets-bomb-syria-police-launched-international-manhunt/story?i

d=35215091.
234. Sharma, supra note 15.
235. Ben Brumfield et al., FrenchJets Bomb ISIS Stronghold of Raqqa, Syria; Few May
Have Been Killed, CNN (Nov. 16, 2015, 12:58 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/
(reporting that French forces
11/16/middleeast/france-raqqa-airstrikes-on-isis
targeted an ISIS command center, ammunition storage base, and training camp in
Syria for targeted airstrikes).
236. Angelique Chrisafis & Julian Borger, French MPs Vote to Extend State of
PM),
(Nov.
19,
2015,
12:30
GUARDIAN
Emergency After Paris Attacks,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/19/french-mps-vote-to-extend-stateof-emergency-after-paris-terror.

1316

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:1273

expanded surveillance capabilities."3
These measures signal
expansion of CVE Policing measures that the State deems vital for
combatting rising radicalization, but are structurally and strategically
at odds with the established assimilationist counterterror philosophy.
Section A analyzes the principal areas of tension between the
cultural assimilationist model and CVE Policing. Section B outlines
strategically tailored proposals that advance France's CVE Policing
program and interests, focused on: (1) dissolution of the most
Headscarf and Face
hardline
assimilationist policies-the
the State's shift away
(2)
recommending
Bans;
and
Concealment
from Macro-CVE Policing philosophy, which views Islam as the source
of radicalization and thus Muslims, at large, as radicalization suspects;
toward adoption of Micro-CVE Policing strategies, which narrowly
hone in on individual deviants and the social roots and structures
that give rise to radicalization.
A.

How CulturalAssimilation Undermines CVE Policing

CVE Policing in France disparately focuses on the practice of Islam
in Muslim-concentrated communities. These communities are none
other than the indigent and socially disconnected banlieues of
France's major cities-ground zeroes for 2005's explosive Paris Riots.
That rioting demographic-overwhelmingly composed of young,
disgruntled, and economically disenfranchised French Muslimscomprises the "youth revolt" associated with radicalization today.3
Approximately one-third of the French Muslim population lives in
Paris and particularly these banlieues,2"' which American sociologist
Tricia Keaton brands "the other France." 24 0 These banlieues exist in

237.

See Glyn Moody, French State of Emergency Allows Website Blocking Device Search

Powers, ARs TECHNICA (Nov. 20, 2015, 10:15 AM), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2015/11 /france-passes-new-emergency-snooping-censorship-law-in-wake-ofparis-attacks (reporting that police may now search digital equipment and any data
that is accessible from that device).
238.
239.

Roy, Al Qaeda Youth Movement, supra note 85, at 4-5.
Audie Cornish, In France, Young Muslims Often Straddle Two Worlds, NPR (Mar.

3, 2015, 4:34 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/03/03/390449785/
in-france-young-muslims-often-straddle-two-worlds; see Ware, supra note 82, at 207
(highlighting the disproportionate poverty experienced by French Muslims within
the banlieues and noting that Maghrebis-Muslim immigrants from northwestern
African states, most notably Algeria and Morocco-and Africans had the highest
proportion residing in public housing, at 47.9 percent and 43.5 percent,
respectively").
240. See generally TRICIA DANIEL KEATON, MusLiM GnusAND THE OTHER FRANCE:
RACE, IDENTITY POLITICS, & SOCIAL EXCLUSION (2006) (analyzing the cultural struggles
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the shadows of the French mitropole, which are often discursively and
politically viewed as "separate Islamic societies, cut off from the
[S]tate."2 41 This framing is reinforced through hardline cultural
assimilationist policies ushered in by Chirac, and bolstered by
Sarkozy,' 2 which, in turn, gave rise to the hardline law enforcement
strategies currently employed in the banlieues.
Currently, France employs a hardline "dragnet" and "kicking the
An
anthill" philosophy to policing French Muslim communities.4
Open Society Institute (OSI) study highlighted the intensity of this
policing model, finding that, in Paris, "Blacks" were six times more
likely on average to be stopped by police than whites, and "Arabs"
were 7.6 times more likely.2 1 Much like "Stop-and-Frisk" tactics used
in the United States, most infamously by the New York Police
Department,2 5 these OSI figures manifest the same racially and
religiously discriminatory pattern that led a United States District
Court to find "Stop-and-Frisk" unconstitutional;2 ' however, race is

and limits to citizenship for France's Muslims, particularly those in the concentrated
banlieues).
241. KEPEL, supra note 40, at 3; see also Kern, supra note 65 ("[T]he problem is
being exacerbated by radical Muslim leaders who are promoting the social
marginalization of Muslim immigrants in order to create a parallel Muslim society in
France that is ruled by Sharia law.").
242. See Ronald Inglehart & Pippa Noris, Muslim Integration into Western Cultures:
Between Origins and Destinations 1 (Harvard Univ. Kennedy Sch. of Gov't, Faculty
Research Working Paper Series No. 09-007, 2009), https://dash.harvard.edu/
bitstream/handle/1/4481625/NorrisMuslimlntegration.pdf (arguing that Islamic
societies in Europe fall midway between social norms of the home country and the
adopted country, which suggests that Muslims neither come to Western society with a
rigid cultural identity, nor shape their cultural identity purely in response to Western
policy). See generally Kristin Baker et al., Combating Islamist Terrorism in Europe, AM.
DIPL. (Nov. 2007), http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2007/1012/bake/ba
keretalislameurope.html (suggesting that "[p]arallel Muslim [slocieties" have
developed).
243. Ragazzi, supra note 115, at 20 ("The French intelligence services regularly
use these legal provisions to obtain information via a method known as a 'dragnet' or
'kicking the anthill,' which involves arresting a large number of people suspected of
being connected in one way or another to radical networks in order to destabilize
and weaken them." (footnote omitted)).
244. OPEN Soc'Y INsT., PROFILING MINORITIES: A STUDY OF STOP-AND-SEARCH
PRACTICES IN PARIS 10 (2009).

245. See Stop-and-FriskData, N.Y. C.L. UNION (2013), http://www.nyclu.org/content
/stop-and-frisk-data (showing that nearly nine out of ten citizens frisked in New York
were innocent, and black and Latino communities were "the overwhelming target of
these tactics").
246. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 658-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(holding that the city's policy of racial profiling, combined with an indifference to
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not even framed as a protected class in France. Even mentioning
race could be viewed as discriminatory, according to a proposed 2013
constitutional amendment.4 7 The post-racial environment of France,
coupled with the cultural counterterror philosophy that targets Islam,
arms law enforcement with the unfettered ability to engage in racially
and religiously discriminatory policing.
This mode of policing, and its collateral effects,"' further
marginalizes French Muslims and deepens their mistrust of law
enforcement and the State at large. Effective CVE Policing requires
trust and, therefore, retrenchment of the cultural assimilation
counterterror and hardline policing tactics currently employed in
More
French Muslim geographies, mosques, and households.
specifically, this hardline assimilationist policing strategy impedes the
effectiveness of CVE Policing in six salient ways.
First, it undermines the cultivation of social capital within French
Muslim communities vital for the advancement of CVE Policing
strategy.
CVE Policing philosophy is founded upon cultivating
collaborative relationships between local law enforcement and target
communities. Traditionally, and still today, National Police and local
police departments have used hardline and punitive policing strategies
in the Muslim-concentrated banlieues, which envision and engage
Muslim citizens as enemies instead of potential counterterror allies.'"
Within a month of the Paris Attacks, the State announced plans to
close up to 160 unlicensed mosques "as part of a nationwide police
operation under the state of emergency" policies enacted by President
These strident responses, which further illustrate the
Hollande."5
State philosophy to domesticate and stifle Islam in France, intensify

widespread constitutional violations, rendered the city liable for violating the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution).
247. Beydoun, French Kiss Race Goodbye, supra note 16 (noting that the ruling
Socialist party proposed to add a ban on the use of race to Article 1 of the French
Constitution, which protects equality under the law).
248. See Ragazzi, supra note 115, at 28 ("Halal butchers were thus closed down for
breaching public health laws; places of worship for violating security regulations; and
streetwear businesses for tax evasion. In May 2007, over five hundred sites were
inspected, and more than two thousand people checked.").
249. Id. at 17 (arguing that France increasingly has used a hardline approach that
expands the length of detentions, muddles the line between information and
evidence, and broadens the scope of investigations).
250. Anealla Safdar, France Likely to Close More than 100 Mosques, ALJAZEERA (Dec.
2, 2015), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/12/france-100-mosques-close-15120
2142023319.html (estimating that there are about 2,500 mosques in France).
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local mistrust. As a result, supporting community collaboration is vital
for carrying forward an effective CVE Policing program.
Second, hardline policing may spur, instead of stifle, radicalization
among French Muslims. Inflexible and aggressive law enforcement
may politicize, or even radicalize, elements within the French Muslim
community.
Instead of preventing radicalization, scholars have
suggested that hardline, or "repressive," policing may "backfire."
"Governments must be cautious in calibrating their approaches,
however.
Repression alone often backfires and causes further
radicalization ....
It appears that a dual strategy-including both
hard- and soft-line measures-is the best policy for inducing
individuals to leave a militant group.""' This lends additional
support to the theory that softer and narrowly tailored policing
strategies, or Micro-CVE Policing, makes for a far more effective
counterterror policing alternative.
Third, the cultural assimilation approach frames Muslim sites of
worship as the very spaces where radicalization is sourced and
spurred. Roy observes that "[r]adicals have a loose or no connection
with the Muslim communities in Europe.""' This suggests that the
radicalization process is not taking shape within the confines of
customary places of Muslim worship and gathering, like mosques or
community centers. To the contrary, radicalization is linked to
previous deviance: "[Radicals] do not represent an Islamic tradition;
on the contrary they break with the religion of their parents. When
they convert or become born-again, they always adopt some sort of
Salafism, which is a scripturalist version of Islam that discards
Salafi mosques are few and far
traditional Muslim culture."'
between in France and are unlicensed by the State. 5

251. ANGEL RABASA ET AL., DERADIcALIzING ISIAMIST EXTREMISTs, xiv-xv (2010),
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RANDMG105
3.pdf (arguing that the State should continue to engage with jailed militants after
their release because de-radicalization reduces individual threats and can also
weaken militant organizations if a "tipping point" is reached).
252. Roy, Driving Force, supra note 93, at 12 (suggesting that terrorists are not
particularly pious, do not regularly attend mosque, and, when they do, do so only to

recruit others to their cause, not to spread their faith).
253. Roy, Islamic TerroristRadicalisation,supra note 19, at 53.
254. See, e.g., Marc Champion, The Imam Who Wants to Purge France's Mosques,
BLOOMBERG:

VIEW

(Nov. 17, 2015, 9:46 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/

articles/2015-11-17/meet-france-s-hardline-moderate-imam (estimating that only 100
mosques out of about 2,500 in France are radical); see also Safdar, supra note 250
(reporting that France intended to shut down radical, unlicensed mosques).
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Stated simply, radicals adopt a foreign brand of Islam not espoused
in the vast majority of French mosques, or they use religion as a
means, or a mask, for furthering non-religious ends."5 The fact that
these radicals are not reared within French mosques or rise from
domestic religious contexts signals two critical conclusions: first, that
targeting domestic religious spaces strays far from the secular source
that give rise to radicalization; and second, that religious leaders may
very well be willing to collaborate with the State to monitor
unfamiliar, deviant actors that emerge from outside of their religious
spaces and community contexts, and slander them as takfiris, or
"apostates. "256
In addition, Muslim residents and families with
radicalized sons-or daughters-would collaborate with law
enforcement at a higher rate if their Muslim identities, at large, were
not criminalized:
More and more, as with the parents of converts, [Muslim parents of
second generation radicalized youth] try to prevent the
radicalization of their children: They call the police; if the
children have left the country, they follow to bring them back; they
fear, with good reason, that the old children will draw in their
257
young siblings.

However, French hardline policing models focus on Islam at large
instead of the secular, deviant individual trajectories of radicals as the
seeds of radicalization.2 5 ' Conflating Islam at large with terrorism
further marginalizes Muslim communities and leads to the intense
state-sponsored backlash witnessed in the immediate wake of the
Paris Attacks, undermining effective CVE Policing programming.
Again, Islam does not radicalize disaffected youths; disaffected youths
subscribing to Salafism, or another deviant interpretation of Islam,
radicalize the faith.

255. See generally Roy, France's Oedipal Islamist Complex, supra note 1 (arguing that
Islamic terrorism represents the "Islamization of radicalism" rather than the
"radicalism of Islam").
256. Safdar, supra note 250 ("Takfiris are classified as Muslims who accuse others
of the same faith of apostasy, an act which has become a sectarian slur.").
257. Roy, France'sOedipal Islamist Complex, supra note 1.
258. This is also true for CVE Policing as currently practiced in the United States,
which is almost entirely concerned with policing Islam and Muslim communities.
Akbar, Policing "Radicalization", supra note 13, at 811; see Amna Akbar, National
Security's Broken Windows, 62 UCLA L. REV. 834, 877 (2015) [Akbar, Broken Windows]
("Radicalization's concern is predicated on a false belief in the teleological character
of Islam-that if Muslim communities witness conservative religious practice and
critical politics, they will view such currents as acceptable and gravitate toward
radicalism, thereby producing more terrorists.").

2016]

BEYOND THE PARIS ATTACKS

1321

Fourth, the cultural assimilationist counterterror philosophy
frames Muslims as counterterror pariahs.
Currently, "France
maintains a strong police and intelligence presence, rather than
cooperating with local imams to create a connection between them
and the local community.""
This strong policing presence is
coupled with the cultural assimilationist approach, which seeks to
reform, erode, or overtake Islam instead of accommodate it. An
integral part of the campaign to domesticate Islam in France is the
training of Muslim leaders, who are used as "tool[s] for
manipulation" 2 " instead of objective interlocutors, committed to
preventing extremism. This policy ignores deviant Muslim actors and
does little to mitigate the collateral guilt and collective backlash such
actors incur on French Muslims at large.
As illustrated in Section II.B, informants function as on-the-ground
monitors, tracking possible identified targets and furnishing police
with probative information that signals radicalization.2 6 ' The quality of
the information, almost invariably, rests upon the reputation of the
informant. Therefore, individuals immersed and respected in the
community are the best conduit for communicating with local law
Imams, respected community figures, business
enforcement.6 2
owners, student leaders, and other figures steeped in the happenings
of a target community make the most effective informants. A hardline
policing approach in the banlieues stifles the State's ability to build
collaborative relationships with key leaders in Muslim communities,
which weakens the core component of CVE Policing strategy.
For example, hardline policing tactics have eroded relationships
with the Union of Islamic Organizations in France (UOIF), which
represents the majority of the Republic's 2,500 registered mosques.
Furthermore, UOIF is an extremely social and political umbrella
organization for French Muslims, with ties to the Union of Muslim
Associations, which is "a Muslim lobby group that aims to mobilize

259.

Carpenter, supra note 152, at 313.

260.

Roy, Islamic Terrorist Radicalisation, supra note 19, at 59 (arguing that when

European countries have attempted to interfere directly with Islam, it fails).
261.

Akbar, Broken Windows, supra note 258, at 853.

262. See id. at 858 (stating that, for CVE, the police look "to 'identify and develop
relationships with community leaders and other individuals who have influence in
their communities and may be helpful conduits of information for the
communities"' (quoting Working with Communities to Disrupt TerrorPlots: HearingBefore
the Subcomm. on Intelligence, Info. Sharing, & Terrorism Risk Assessment of the H. Comm. on
Homeland Sec., 111th Cong. 7 (2010) (statement of Brett Hovington, Supervisory
Special Agent, Head of Comm. Relations Unit, FBI)).
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Muslims to elect candidates in local elections around Islamic
issues."'26 Certainly, easing relationships with UOIF-associated clerics
will create portals toward building strategic relationships with
religious leaders with broad reach, particularly within the banlieues,
facilitating greater relationships with Muslim politicians and elected
officials.
Both are critical steps toward carrying an individualoriented CVE Policing model forward.
Fifth, the Headscarf and Face Concealment Bans disenfranchised
Muslim women, dissuading them from being useful as prospective
counterterror partners. The Headscarf and Face Concealment Bans
severely diminish law enforcement's capacity to recruit French
Muslim women as informants and interlocutors. This is especially the
case with conservative French Muslim women, who don the headscarf
or the face concealment, or would otherwise do so if these Bans were
not in place.2 " Consequently, apart from the broader strategic
dissonance these Bans create with regard to mainstreaming CVE
Policing, the immediate impact of these Bans curb the State's
capacity to enlist French Muslim women as CVE informants. In
particular, recruiting women with deep reach and resonance within
the religious, political, and communal spaces perceived to foment
radicalization would be the precise type of CVE informant and
interlocutor that law enforcement covets.
As examined more closely in Section B, the hardline state aim of
domesticating Islam is at odds with emergent national security
concerns. Roy observes, "the management of Islam should not be
identified as a security issue first: in this case it will re-enforce the
fascination of 'rebels looking for a cause' towards what is constructed
by the West as an arch-enemy. Instead of 'exceptionalising,' we
should 'normalise. '265

263. Kern, supra note 65; see alsoJocelyne Cesari, Islam in France: The Shaping of a
Religious Minority, in MuSuMS IN THE WEST: FROM SOJOURNERS TO CITIZENS 45-46
(Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad ed., 2002) (describing the history of the Union of Islamic
Organizations in France as an organization aiming to bridge the cultural divide
between European society and immigrant Muslims).
264. See Kim Willsher, French Muslim Women on Burqa Ban Ruling: "All I Want Is to
Live in Peace", GUARDIAN (July 1, 2014, 2:26 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
(citing a researcher
world/2014/jul/01 /french-muslim-women-burqa-ban-ruling
from Human Rights Watch who argues that the Bans "undermine the rights of
women who choose to wear the veil and do little to protect those who are compelled
to do so").
265. Roy, Driving Force, supra note 93, at 13-14 (arguing that to counter the
terrorist message that Islam is a religion of the oppressed, western states should
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By meddling with the religious liberties of French Muslims, as a
means to advance national security, the State embeds the longstanding and vitriolic narrative that France and Islam are warring and
irreconcilable.
This binary is especially perplexing for French
Muslims and, more specifically, for French Muslim women donning
the headscarf or face concealment. Thus, instead of enacting policies
that envision the headscarf as a marker of radicalization or a "flag of
revolt,"2" a pluralist approach toward French Muslims will signal a
major move away from the "clash of civilisations" binary... and toward
"integration and even 'empowerment, "28 which will build trust and
stimulate support from French Muslims equally committed to
suppressing radicalization.
Sixth, the CVE-practices unreasonably stretch the State's arm into
Because the Headscarf and Face
everyday Muslim family life.
the most private areas of individual
infringe
upon
Concealment Bans
and familial life, French Muslims are highly suspicious of any and all
state interventions concerned with policing religious-and culturalidentity, and compelling cultural assimilation. Therefore, the State
and local law enforcement fail to develop social capital and personal
inroads with French Muslims for hard CVE Policing programs and
soft CVE strategies,26 9 particularly in the banlieues-sites of
disproportionate criminal, cultural, and national security policing.
Within these over-policed spaces, French Muslim men and women
will overwhelmingly dismiss police overtures to work with them as

attempt to normalize the religion and let "imams . . . be imams, not police
auxiliaries").
266. Body-Gendrot, supra note 65, at 291 (arguing that the hijab has different uses
and meanings for different Muslims depending on the context).
267. See generally Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, 72 FOREIGN AFF.
22, 22-23 (1993) (espousing the theory that the primary source of state conflict will
stem from cultural differences between societies). But see Khaled A. Beydoun, DarAlIslam Meets "Islam as Civilization": An Alignment of Politico-TheoreticalFundamentalisms
and the Geopolitical Realism of this Worldview, 4 UCLAJ. IsLAMIc & NEAR E.L. 143, 144-

45 (2005) (critiquing Samuel Huntington's theory, which assumes that Islam is
monolithic, by highlighting sectarian division and in-fighting among Muslim groups,
indicative of heterogeneity and division).
268.

Roy, Islamic Terrorist Radicalisation, supra note 19, at 58

(advocating a

pluralistic approach to integration, which accepts different interpretations of Islam
including more traditional ones).
269. Ragazzi, supra note 115, at 4, 30-33 (defining soft counter-radicalization
policies as police-community partnerships, community policing awareness programs,
and mentorships as well as co-sponsored events, dinners, and task force meetings
convening policemen and women, religious leaders, community advocates, political
figures, and nonprofit leaders).
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Consequently, this would severely
interlocutors and informants.
weaken CVE Policing in the very spaces where radicalization is
thought to be most pervasive.
As examined below, dissolution of the Headscarf and Face
Concealment Bans will function as a landmark policy, moving away
from the rigid assimilationist philosophy ushered in under President
Chirac and bolstered by President Sarkozy. The policy will open the
door for French authorities to "make room for Islam without changing
[its] law or principles"270 and therefore recoil its arms from the private
lives and religious sensibilities of French Muslim citizens and families.
B.

Toward Effective PolicingAfter Paris: Policy Proposals

By diminishing religious pluralism,
the hardline cultural
assimilationist counterterror philosophy ushered in by the Headscarf
Ban undermines the structural capacity and strategic aims of CVE
Policing. This Section argues that dissolution of the Headscarf and
Face Concealment Bans make for the most symbolically and politically
effective means for maximizing effective CVE Policing during a critical
time of terror attacks and spiking homegrown radicalization.
Second, this Section highlights pivotal social science that links
radicalization in Europe to social factors external to Islam,
disconnected from principal Muslim institutions and spaces
stereotypically associated with radicalization.
Dissolvingthe Headscarfand Face ConcealmentBans
President Chirac's cultural assimilation campaign, carried forward
by President Sarkozy, enabled strident anti-Muslim legislation that
formed the fulcrum of their counterterror programs. The Headscarf
Ban was the signature cultural assimilationist policy of the Chirac
administration, while the Face Concealment Ban is the cornerstone
of Sarkozy's."' Collectively, these Bans criminalize core expressions
of Islamic piety; though attributed to women, the expression of
donning a headscarf are seen as central to the Muslim family
structure. The Bans also impact the French Muslim population across
1.

270.

Roy, Islamic TerroristRadicalisation,supra note 19, at 58.

271. Jessica Aldred, Jaques Chirac Backs Headscarf Ban, GUARDIAN (Dec. 17, 2003,
4:43
AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/education/2003/dec/17/schools.ukl;
Angelique Chrisafis, Nicolas Sarkozy Says Islamic Veils Are Not Welcome in France,
GUARDIAN (June 22, 2009, 2:35 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/
jun/22/islamic-veils-sarkozy-speech-france.
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lines of gender and piety.2 12 By circumscribing the religious rights of
French Muslim women and meddling with the religious affairs of French
Muslim families, the two Bans intensified the alienation of French
Muslim citizens, particularly within the nation's circuit of banlieues.27 3
Shortly after the Paris Attacks, Holland declared that France will
launch a two-front "pitiless" war against ISIS strongholds in Iraq and
Syria, and the Muslim-concentrated banlieues within the heart of
France.4 CVE Policing was adopted as the primary strategy on the
domestic front.27 5 In light of the practical and political challenges
posed by the cultural assimilationist counterterror approach, the
Hollande administration will have to peel back its hardline
assimilationist philosophy and, most notably, its cornerstone laws.
Since mitigating tension and building amicable relationships within
French Muslim communities is pivotal to the aim of preventing
radicalization within them, the optimal means to achieve these ends is
to (1) reassess the Headscarf and Face Concealment Bans and (2)
consider their dissolution as a means to carry forward narrowly tailored
and effective CVE Policing strategies, or "Micro-CVE Policing." 76
Dissolving the two Bans will, in the short and long term, advance
the counterterror goals of the State and also broaden the religious
rights of French Muslims. 277

Furthermore, dissolving the Bans-

particularly the Headscarf Ban, which is more commonly worn and
accepted by different schools of Islamic thought-will facilitate the
integration of French Muslim citizens and communities. Ending the
Headscarf ban will also contribute to de-radicalization at the very
roots that foment it:

272. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 176-78 (discussing the targeting of
the Face Concealment Ban toward both women and men).
273. See KFATON, supra note 240, at 4 (arguing that Muslim girls may increasingly
wear headscarfs to school after the Ban as a sign of protest, leading to student
expulsion and increasing isolation).
274. See Chrisafis, Nothing's Changed, supra note 5 (noting that Hollande, a
member of the French Socialist Party, campaigned for the presidency by promising
to end the ghettoes and the racial profiling under stop and frisk).
275. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (describing the move towards CVE
Policing after the Merah affair).
276. See infra Section III.B.2 (analyzing the contradiction between CVE and the
policies restricting the rights of Muslims, namely that these policies further
exacerbate the underlying tensions which give rise to radicalism).
277.

Cf Bell, supra note 49, at 524 (noting that the Brown v. Board of Education

decision had the side benefits of adding credibility to America's image abroad and
improving relations with African Americans who served during World War II).
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European authorities should simply make room for Islam ....
Genuine pluralism is the best way to avoid confrontation with a
Muslim population, itself very diverse, but that could feel coerced
Conservative and even
into a ghettoised community.
fundamentalist views of religion can be manageable in a plural
environment, and a pluralistic approach allows civil society to reach
the cadres of youth that could be prime targets for radicals and
neo-fundamentalist groups.2 7 8
"Making room" for Islam also means viewing it as faith instead of a
"racial identity" exclusively along lines of Arab or Maghrebi
identity.279 In addition, as closely examined below, retrenching the
domestic culture war on French Muslims also stifles ISIS's aim of
pushing its "France is oppressive against Muslims" messaging, which
resonates with its disaffected Muslim youth.so
Culturally integrative policies will not bring about immediate onthe-ground reform, but they will create immediate goodwill between
the State and France's Muslim population. This goodwill, if gradually
nurtured through soft CVE strategies, such as community outreach
programs funded by the State, 8 will cultivate social capital and
develop stronger relationships between local law enforcement and
Muslim communities.28 This is essential in the most disenfranchised
and downtrodden segments of France's population, which are heavily
concentrated in the banlieues and interlocked between systematic
state violence, poverty, and the recruitment reach of ISIS.
of hardline
From a strategic standpoint, retrenchment
assimilationist policies is essential for carrying forward effective CVE
Policing programming within France. But these reforms are only the
first prong in building a more sustainable CVE Policing regime.
The second, discussed below, focuses on identifying the very
stimuli and roots that give rise to radicalization. Instead of policing
with a broad brush and conflating Islam-and Muslims at large-with
radicalization, Micro-CVE Policing initiatives maximize opportunities

278. Roy, Islamic TerroristRadicalisation,supra note 19, at 58.
279. Fellag, supra note 14, at 4.
280. Atran & Hamid, supra note 2, at 2 (arguing that Muslims in France have been
especially susceptible to ISIS recruitment due to marginalized Islamic communities,
and that ISIS's strategy is to "drive a wedge" between Muslims and non-Muslims).
281. Ragazzi, supra note 115, at 11 (describing one such program).
282. RABASA, supra note 251, at xv (suggesting that law enforcement should retain
ties with suspected terrorists even after they leave custody).
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to integrate French Muslims into the counterterror effort of
monitoring individuals susceptible to "jihadist radicalisation." 2 "
From "Macro"to "Micro-CVE Policing"
As enforced in the United States, CVE Policing is overwhelmingly
Professor Akbar
concerned with policing Muslim communities.
observes that "[r]adicalization's concern is predicated on a false
belief in the teleological character of Islam-that if Muslim
communities witness conservative religious practice and critical
politics, they will view such currents as acceptable and gravitate
toward radicalism. "284
Therefore, a de facto tenet of CVE Policing is to view Islam as
monolithic and its followers presumptively prone to radicalization.
This Macro-CVE approach exposes Muslims of all sects and schools of
thought to heightened scrutiny, especially the indigent and working
class communities that are disparately vulnerable to Macro-CVE's
collateral impacts.2 85
While "Islam radicalizes Muslims" is the prevailing CVE Policing
logic,2 8 6 social science literature rebuts this state-sponsored
presumption by offering two separate, but linked, counterarguments.
First, identified and prosecuted Muslim radicals do not emerge from
domestic Muslim communities, but are disconnected from them and
have backgrounds characterized by wayward activity and non2.

religiosity.2 87

In

short,

instead

of Islam

radicalizing

Muslims,

previously nominal, fickle, and "opportunistic" Muslims embrace neofundamentalist iterations of Islam and radicalize the faith:
The rallying cry of these youth is opportunistic: Today it is the
Islamic State; yesterday, they were with al Qaeda; before that, in
1995, they were subcontractors for the Algerian Armed Islamic
Group, or they practiced the nomadism of personal jihad ....

283. Roy, Driving Force, supra note 93, at 11 ("[W]e should make a distinction
between religious radicalisation andjihadist radicalisation.").
284. Akbar, Broken Windows, supra note 258, at 877.
285. See generally Beydoun, Indigence, Islamophobia and Erasure, supra note 44, at 6
(examining the disproportionate scrutiny and immediate perils CVE Policing poses
to poor and working class Muslim communities in the United States, and in
particular, CVE's three pilot cities: Boston, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis).
286. See Roy, France's Oedipal Islamist Complex, supra note 1 (claiming that one
predominant theory for radicalization is that Islam "cannot be integrated into the
West").
287. Roy, Islamic Terrorist Radicalisation,supra note 19, at 52.
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Tomorrow they will fight under another banner, so long as combat
death, age, or disillusion do not empty their ranks.
Second, social scientists argue that these deviant Muslim actors that
radicalize Islam are made susceptible to radicalization and terrorism
because of poverty, unemployment, social disaffection, and other
structural ills pervasive within the banlieues."' Linked to the
argument above, this argument reframes the roots of radicalization
on the very "ghettoization of Muslims" President Hollande promised
to end when he came to power in May 2012.' Thus, the government
should adopt a dual policy: they should address poverty within the
Muslim-concentrated banlieues while simultaneously tailoring CVE
policy away from broader Islam, focusing instead on fringe
demographic groups at the greatest risk of radicalization. Echoing
this refocusing, Roy observes: "[W] e should make a distinction
between religious radicalisation and jihadist radicalisation.""' I label
this approach as Micro-CVE Policing.
Micro-CVE Policing shifts state scrutiny away from France's 4.7 million
Muslim citizens and narrows its scope to monitor a far smaller pool of
prospective radicals. In addition to minimizing the collective guilt and
collateral state scrutiny of Muslims exacted by Macro-CVE Policing,
Micro-CVE Policing offers a more direct and effective means by focusing
closely on the roots of radicalization to accomplish its stated aims.
Social scientists argue that identified and prosecuted radicals in
Europe, many of whom commit the types of terror attacks like those
listed in Section I.B, all engaged in deviant secularity activity before
radicalizing." These secular activities are a common denominator,
suggesting that these baselines-not Islam-are the seeds that give
rise to radicalization.
Many of the terrorists had unexceptional
backgrounds: they had "a 'normal' Western teenager's upbringing,
with no conspicuous religious practices, often going to night clubs,
'womansing' and drinking alcohol"; backgrounds that "do not
represent an Islamic tradition; [but,] on the contrary[,] they break
with the religion of their parents"; and no involvement "in any

288.
289.

Roy, France'sOedipalIslamist Complex, supranote 1.
See Roy, Islamic TerroristRadicalisation,supra note 19, at 58 ("Concentrating on

sociology and the motivations of the radicals is important in understanding their
mode of recruitment, but will be of little use in drying up the ground on which they
prosper.").
290.
291.

Chrisafis, Nothing's Changed, supra note 5.
Roy, DrivingForce, supra note 93, at 11.

292. See supra note 207 (explaining that the terrorists who committed the Paris
attacks had only a loose connection with Islamic communities).
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legitimate anti-war movements or even in organised political support
for the people they claim to be fighting for.""
Further demonstrating that Muslim radicals neither have
backgrounds steeped in religion or footing in Muslim communities,
France's Center for the Prevention of Sectarian Drift Related to Islam,
"[e] stimates that 90 percent of French citizens who have radical Islamist
beliefs have French grandparents and 80 percent come from nonreligious families."' Thus, Macro-CVE Policing strategy proves futile
when deploying resources and manpower to mosques, religious centers,
and other spaces concentrated with Muslim citizens. These findings
illustrate that CVE Policing should focus on the secular structures and
spaces that give rise to criminal activity, gangs, drug dealing, and prisons.
Instead of carrying forward law enforcement programs driven by the
collective suspicion of Islam and French Muslims, which brings about
collateral punishment of innocents-spurring greater disaffectionMicro-CVE Policing shifts the focus away from Islam and onto nonreligious roots that give rise to radicalization.
In line with this broader pattern of criminal and religious deviance,
research illustrates that prisons are very common recruiting grounds
for radicals." Many of the identified and killed radicals, including
Mohammed Merah and Mehdi Nemmouche, culprits of the Merah
Affair of 2012 and the Nemmouche Affairs of 2014, respectively, and
Charlie Hebdo assailant, Cherif Kouachi, were allegedly radicalized
in prison. 9 Muslim inmates comprise sixty to seventy percent of the
French prison population,"' "a situation that has left a very large
number of young French Muslims vulnerable to absorbing radical
ideas in prison and out."" 8

293.

Yet, instead of softening the hardline

Roy, Islamic Terrorist Radicalisation, supra note 19, at 52-54. But see Spearlt,

Muslim Radicalization in Prison: Responding with Sound Penal Policy or the Sound of

Alarm?, 49 GONZ. L. REv. 37, 53-56 (2014) (summarizing the generally positive
influence Islam has on inmate morale, discipline, and rehabilitation).
294. See Atran & Hamid, supra note 2, at 3 (citing estimates made by the Center
for the Prevention of Sectarian Drift Related to Islam, an organization started by
families concerned that their loved ones were becoming radicalized).
295. See RABASA, supra note 251, at xxii (recognizing the "increasing severity" of
radicalization inside European prisons). But see Spearlt, supra note 293, at 65-66
(arguing that the relationship between prison and violent extremism is "tenuous at
best" and that the number of inmates that go on to commit acts of terrorism is
"extremely small").
296.

France: Extremism & Counter-Extremism, supra note 86, at 3.

297. Id. at 10; see also Atran & Hamid, supra note 2 (" [A]s much as 70 percent of
the prison population is Muslim. . . .").
298. Atran & Hamid, supra note 2.
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policing that lead to this disproportionate incarceration of French
Muslim men, the State responded by "reorganizing its prison system
in order to isolate jihadist inmates from other inmates.""
This research illustrates that the Islamist terrorists emerge from
reclusive backgrounds far from the religious spaces Macro-CVE Policing
Thus, this suggests that
programs are concerned with monitoring.'
innocent Muslim communities,
Macro-CVE Policing victimizes
undermines strategic inroads within the communities, and, most critically,
misses the very elements that are not only prone to radicalization, but
proven to be mobilized toward terrorist action. Roy concludes:
The Western-based Islamic terrorists are not the militant vanguard
of the Muslim community; they are a lost generation, unmoored
from traditional societies and cultures, frustrated by a Western
society that does not meet their expectations. And their vision of a
global ummah is both a mirror of and a form of revenge against
the globalisation that has made them what they are.so0
Therefore, policing mainstream and majoritarian mosques,
community spaces, and French Muslim households veers markedly
from the root spaces that give rise to radicalization, and fails to
address the structural seeds that harvest it.
Critiques of Macro-CVE Policing also posit that social and
economic marginalization, not Islam, is what radicalizes French
Muslims, Muslim converts,o 2 and non-Muslim youths."' Mitigating
social ills such as poverty, racism, police brutality, unemployment,
and the nihilism they breed'3 which were explosively manifested in

299.

See France: Extremism & Counter-Extremism, supra note 86, at 8 (explaining that

the policy was intended to reduce the ability for radical Islamists to spread their
radical ideology).
300.

See Roy, Islamic Terrorist Radicalisation, supra note 19, at 54-56 (noting that

Islamic terrorists are "a lost generation, unmoored from traditional societies and
cultures").
301. Id. at 55-56; see also Bizina & Gray, supra note 211, at 73 (echoing the revenge
motive of terrorists, arguing that "[r]adical Islamist ideology offered an outlet for
their anger at the country that supposedly failed them").
302. Roy, Driving Force, supra note 93, at 9 (explaining that converts comprise
twenty-five percent of radicalized youths in France).
303. See supra Section III.A (positing that economic marginalization has led to a
youth revolt that has resulted in radicalization).
304. Roy, Driving Force, supra note 93, at 10 (explaining that a component of the
extremist ideology is a "generational nihilism" in which young people turn to
violence as a way of acting out their frustrations); see also Olivier Roy & Nicholas
Truong, The Attractions offihadism, and a GenerationalNihilism StretchingFar Beyond the
Muslim Sphere, OPENDEMOCRACY (Oct. 8, 2014), https://www.opendemocracy.net/

can-europe-make-it/olivier-roy-nicholas-truong/attractions-of-jihadism-and-
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the 2005 Paris Riots, may not only prevent radicalization, but could
diminish its capacity to take form in France. Marc Sageman observes,
"Those who feel that society as a whole has the least to offer them are
the most likely to join" a terrorist network like Al Qaeda or ISIS.
Finally, a leading economist contends that Macro-CVE Policing
strategies are misdirected because of their emphasis on concentrated,
indigent, and working class Muslim communities, instead of middle
class and affluent contexts where terrorist groups center their
recruitment.3 0
Alan Krueger's findings suggest that terrorist
organizations prioritize recruitment from affluent and elite
backgrounds."' Thus, counter-radicalization efforts should focus on
or headquarters of terrorist networks, such as
the "demand side,"
ISIS or Al Qaeda, instead of French Muslim communities, including
the banlieues.
Furthermore, addressing and retrenching the
structural catalysts that facilitate ISIS recruitment will not only
diminish their resonance, but also enable greater integration of
French Muslim communities.
Political scientists Atran and Hamid similarly view radicalization as
a process that is less triggered by economic marginalization, but
rather activated by ideological fervor that supersedes socioeconomic
circumstance:' "If people are ready to sacrifice their lives, then it is
not likely that offers of greater material advantages will stop them."3 1 0
Their contention weakens the argument in favor of both Macro and
Micro-CVE Policing.
Yet, despite this critique, Atran and Hamid agree that the hardline
cultural assimilationist philosophy currently advanced by France,
principally through the Headscarf and Face Concealment Bans,
contributes to ISIS's grand narrative of Muslim oppression in the

generational-nihilism-str (explaining that this nihilism effects youths who feel they
"have lost out as a result of globalisation").
305. SAGEMAN, supra note 85, at 118.
306. ALAN B. KRUEGER, WHAT MAKES A TERRORIST: ECONOMICS AND THE RooTS OF
TERRORISM 3-4 (2007) (arguing that terrorists are not motivated because they are

"desperately poor" but rather because they "care so deeply and fervently about a
cause that they are willing to die for it").
307. Id. at 32-33 (suggesting that terrorist organizations screen for those who are
mostly likely to succeed).
308. See generally id. (arguing, for example, that one relevant factor in predicting
whether radicalism will spread is whether a country has reduced civil liberties and
political rights).
309. Atran & Hamid, supra note 2.
310. Id.
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West."' A "pitiless" war on the homefront, inflicting even more
damage on French Muslims and fomenting even greater disaffection,
will only intensify radicalization after Paris.
CONCLUSION

"Keep your French Republican illusions to yourself
A beautiful Franceruined by Afrcans ...
Human beings were not meant to live in these projects,
One could not integrate into hatredand rejection."

-KeryJames

3 12

"Didyou think that when those heads ourforefathers had forcibly bowed down
to the ground were raised again, you would see adoration in their eyes?"

"

-Jean Paul Sartre31

November 13, 2015, forever changed the meaning of "Friday the
Thirteenth" in French. The horrific events of that day also stand to
permanently reform the identity of the French counterterrorism
program causing, as evidenced by developments in its immediate
wake, a rejiggering of its domestic war on terror. While promising a
"pitiless" war against ISIS on the international front,"' President
Hollande's adoption of "Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)"
measures in 2012 signals state commitment to this emergent
This strategic shift toward CVE is
counterterror model.315
undergirded by a myriad of conflicts with the cultural assimilationist
philosophy in France, which pits French identity in direct opposition
to Muslim identity.
Until the Paris Attacks, the State's chosen policing tactic was to
storm the streets of banlieues like Clichy-sous-Bois, inflicting targeted

311. Id. (arguing that ISIS's strategy of recruitment is "to turn their personal
frustrations and grievances into a universal theme of persecution against all
Muslims").
312. KERY JAMES, Lettre a la Republique [Letter to the Republic], on 92.2012 (2012),
translated in MP3TuNEs.TK, http://www.mp3tunes.tk/download?v=XI-7NKDQKoU
(last visited Aug. 17, 2016).
313. Jean Paul Sartre, Black Orpheus, in L'ART NEGRE PRESENCE AFRICAINE 10-11
219,219 (S.W. Allen trans., 1951).
314. Sharma, supra note 15.
315. Rascoff, supra note 26, at 127 (arguing that counter-radicalization follows
"the preemptive logic of counterterrorism, which focuses on strategies that minimize
the risk and intensity of future terrorist attacks").
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and collateral punishment on Muslim citizens presumptively prone to
radicalization, or linked to terrorist activity.31'
However, 11/13
marked the beginning of a counterterror paradigm shift to CVE
Policing; a strategy requiring a move away from the knocking heads
and kicking down doors counterterror approach France currently
employs and gradual adoption of the collaborative strategies
attendant with the emergent counterterrorism model.
For years, the veiled and unveiled heads of France's Muslim
citizens in Clichy-sous-Bois, Montfermeil,"' and other banlieues were
forced to the ground. The assimilationist aims of the State prevented
the integration of Muslim identity into the archetype of French
identity held up by the State. These aims were realized through the
criminalizing of conspicuous expression of Muslim identity and
linking other forms of Islamic religiosity with suspicion of terrorism.
This was routinely enforced through police violence, and inflicted by
state neglect of the structural ills that perpetuate poverty and
unemployment, nihilism and existential despair endemic to the
Muslim-dominated banlieues.
For many young Muslim extremists in the banlieues, Islam is more
political "revolt" than religious expression;"' they break away from
the religious traditions of their families, are largely ignorant of
Islamic practices and the letter of the law, and "[t]he religious leaders
they eventually choose to follow are often self-proclaimed imams. "319
Yet, despite this profile-and the fact that French government had
the vast majority of these terrorists on the watch-list-the State still
This is a
continues to police and indict Muslims at large.'
dangerous dynamic that exposes French Muslims with dissident
political views to state-sponsored scrutiny and violence, and puts
them within the recruitment reach of ISIS.
The Paris Attacks, followed by the Bastille Day attack in Nice, show
that emergent counterterrorism strategies require the lifting of these
316. See supra Section I.B (suggesting that the terror attacks preceding the Paris
attacks led to anti-Islamic policies, such as the Headscarf Ban, and increased support
for the French National Front party).
317. Kern, supra note 65 (pointing out that these two banlieues are part of the
Seine-Saint-Denis district, home to more than 600,000 Muslims and some of the
highest concentrated Muslim neighborhoods in France).
318. ROBERT S. LEIKEN, EUROPE'S ANGRY MUSLIMS: THE REVOLT OF THE SECOND
GENERATION 75 (2012) (arguing that Islamic migrants develop an ideology based
partly on a political narrative that the West is oppressing Muslims and that Muslims
themselves have culturally "gone astray").
319.

Roy, France's Oedipal Islamist Complex, supra note 1.

320.

Id.
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bowed heads in the banlieues. Enacting culturally tolerant policies that
integrate French Muslims as full-fledged citizens,3 2 1 and, subsequently,
as objective national security interlocutors instead of presumptive
enemies, is vital to further the national security interests of the State.
This view of French Muslims as citizens instead of suspects may not
mark a genuine moment of progress or renewed tolerance, but, very
frankly, an impasse signaling the State's national security interests
converging with the citizenship interests of French Muslims. More
importantly, pitting French identity against Islam perpetuates the
"clash of civilisations" binary ISIS promotes and is bent on creating
within its fluidly expanding territory and spheres of opposition.
Dissolving the Headscarf and Face Concealment Bans may not spur
adoration for the State in the eyes of French Muslims, particularly not
in the short term. But lifting these laws and, in turn, retrenching the
hardline cultural assimilationist policies that have ravaged French
Muslim communities for decades, may create new inroads that
advance the goals of CVE Policing and facilitate the mainstreaming of
sustainable, precise, and religiously tolerant Micro-CVE Policing
strategies. This goodwill move may gradually prevent the brand of
extremist radical threat that forever changed France on Vendredi 13
and beyond.

321. See BOSNIAK, supra note 140, at 30-31 (arguing that social groups that now
enjoy citizenship rights in name may nonetheless lack complete citizen rights in
practice, particularly if the group is perceived to be "'foreign' in character").

